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I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how often
action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to
end.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes1

I. INTRODUCTION: WHITHER AMERiCAN WIRELESS?
In 1993, the United States Congress envisioned two alternative marketplace scenarios for providers and consumers of commercial mobile radio
services (CMRS) in the United States. In the first scenario, CMRS and personal communications services (PCS) would be affordable, if not essential
parts of most peoples' lives. U.S. business would excel in global competitiveness due in part to Americans' easy access to the latest in telecommunications technology. "Just-in-time" access to information would put U.S. corporations ahead of rivals abroad. A diverse group of CMRS providers would
offer a wide range of wireless services at competitive prices, a situation
made possible by low market entry barriers and competition among several
wireless networks operating in all markets.2 Competition and limited regula1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291,
296 (1920).
2. The terms wireless and CMRS are used interchangeably in this Article unless oth-
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tion would spur investment in research and the development of new services.3
In the second scenario, the United States would lag behind the rest of
the world in widespread access to affordable wireless communication services. Wireline monopoly networks would comprise the dominant mode of
communication. Demand for and use of CMRS would be satisfied by high
costs that limit ubiquity and widespread use. Competitors abroad would
benefit from the high penetration of continent-wide wireless systems with
the accompanying freedom of movement and instantaneous access to information for the many instead of the few. Research and development would
remain stagnant in the United States and few new products would emerge
due to pervasive state regulation of CMRS. The heavy hand of regulation exercised by one federal and fifty state commissions would make potential
wireless investors wary and operators lethargic. U.S. consumers would have
only a vague awareness of wireless as a service that seemed to hold great
potential and experienced great success abroad, but never lived up to its
promise in the United States.
Sensing a dramatic turning point for U.S. wireless telecommunications,
President Clinton and Congress resoundingly endorsed competition, the relaxation of federal and elimination of state regulation, and the widespread
availability of spectrum through government-sponsored auctions envisioned
in the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (1993 Act).4 In President Clinton's
words: "This plan creates the infrastructure to develop the most advanced
commercial wireless communication networks the world has ever known. It
will allow an industry to grow by tens of billions of dollars by the end of the
decade, producing hundreds of thousands of new high-skilled, high-wage
erwise stated. See infra note 7. Wireless technology can support mobile, fixed, or both uses.
3. For a general analysis of competitive conditions in the CMRS marketplace, see Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Second Report, 12 FCC Rcd. 11,266, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1997).
4. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b), 107
Stat. 312, 392 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)). Additionally, 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(1)(A) authorizes the Commission to forebear from regulation if it concludes regulation is: unnecessary to protect consumers, inconsistent with the public interest, and unnecessary to protect against unreasonable rates. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act: Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and
Order,9 FCC Rcd. 1411, paras. 124-219, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 835 (1994) (discussing
FCC forbearance decisions). An amendment to the Communications Act in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 also permits the FCC to forbear from regulating particular classes
of telecommunications services or providers. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 401, §
10(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) (West Supp. 1997). There is not much doubt that Congress's
adoption of amendments to section 332 denied states' authority over rates and entry. The
Authors maintain that by also amending Section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
Congress eliminated state jurisdiction over matters for or in connection with intrastate
communications except for a circumscribed list of "other terms and conditions" of service.
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jobs."5 Despite the strong preference articulated by Congress and the Clinton
Administration for light-handed regulation and a number of significant Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) decisions implementing the statutory directive, a pivotal jurisdictional debate is now taking
place at the Commission and in the court system. 6 Its outcome will decide
whether a unique communications medium with much promise for the business and personal lives of Americans will be allowed to develop in a uniform
deregulatory environment that promotes competition.7
Because wireless networks increasingly operate on a multistate or on a
nationwide competitive basis and calls frequently traverse state borders,
Congress freed wireless carriers from the dual (federal and state) regulatory
jurisdictional system designed to regulate the monopoly common carrier activities of the former Bell System and the hundreds of independent telephone
companies around the country (such as GTE) that were not part of the Bell
System. Congress reasonably concluded that today's wireless networks differ fundamentally from monopoly local exchange carriers. Indeed, a wireless
call to Virginia may originate in the District of Columbia, while the caller
drives across the state line to Maryland and the call is routed to and switched
in New York. If CMRS providers were treated like wireline carriers they
would be forced to make artificial distinctions so that their calls could be
classified into historic state or federal regulatory categories that would be
antediluvian, unnecessary, and harmful. The imposition of these outdated requirements would impede the development of wireless in the United States.
Nevertheless, that is precisely what landline competitors, some states, and
perhaps even the Commission may seek to do, notwithstanding these fundamental differences and Congress's legislation establishing a federal regula-

5. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at a Communications Technology
Demonstration (July 22, 1993), in 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1418, 1419 (July 22,
1993).
6. See generally Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12
FCC Rcd. 8776, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Report and
Order]; Federal-State Bd. on Universal Serv., Joint Petitionfor Reconsideration of Coincast Cellular, Inc. & Vanguard Cellular Sys., Inc. in CC Dkt. No. 96-45 (July 17, 1997) (on
file with authors); Federal-State Bd. on Universal Serv., Petition for Reconsideration of
Nextel Comm., Inc. in CC Dkt. No. 96-45 (July 17, 1997) (on file with authors); Petition of
Pittencrieff Comm., Inc. for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Preemption of the Tex. Pub.
Util. Reg. Act of 1995, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041
(1997) [hereinafter PittencrieffOrder].
7. This Article addresses regulatory policies applied to mobile communications services. The 1993 Budget Act policies do not apply to wireless networks that are fixed, rather
than mobile. This artificial distinction would result in a solely fixed network operator being
regulated as would a comparable wireline carrier. The Authors believe this result is neither
efficient, desirable, nor in the public interest. They suggest that Congress should treat all
wireless entities as it treats CMRS providers.
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tory system for CMRS providers.
In the wake of Congress's CMRS amendments to the 1993 Act and the
increased awareness of CMRS issues engendered by the statute, the FCC
took several actions that demonstrated its understanding of the inherently
interstate nature of CMRS. s Since then, much of the Commission's energies
have been diverted by other significant issues such as conducting spectrum
auctions, licensing services, and, perhaps most importantly, by its role in
solving the myriad technological and political challenges raised by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act). Because the future of wireless
regulation and the industry will ultimately be determined by the decisions of
regulatory bodies and the courts,9 this Article seeks to focus the attention of
regulators, practitioners, and jurists on the federal jurisdictional scheme for
CMRS established by Congress.
This Article will examine the 1993 Act, its legislative history, the
Communications Act of 1934, and the relationship between the statutes in
the overall context of telecommunications industry regulation. The last task
is complicated by the recent passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. The Authors conclude that the amendments to sections 332 and 2(b) in
the 1993 Act explicitly give the Commission exclusive, plenary regulatory
jurisdiction over CMRS providers, save for the limited consumer affairs
authority Congress determined should be maintained by the states.10 The
states' remaining authority over CMRS providers is strictly limited. In sum,
Congress sought to achieve its view of a uniform, nationwide deregulatory
environment for CMRS by centralizing authority in the Commission and directing it to rely upon market forces, not regulation. In several instances, the
Commission, state regulators, and courts have argued that Congress's actions

8. For example, in 1994, the FCC created a Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to
concentrate the FCC's efforts relating to the industry and acted decisively in rejecting every
state commission application to continue to regulate intrastate CMRS services. In addition,
in 1995, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that tentatively concluded that the interconnection policies of local telephone companies posed a significant
threat to the development of CMRS as a competing local communications service provider.
Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Radio Serv. Providers,
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 5020, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2055 (1996).
9. See Petitions for Cert., Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
grantedsub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
10. State communications jurisdiction pursuant to section 2(b) would appear to extend
to consumer billing and related matters. It does not appear that Congress intended to eliminate state antitrust, contract, or other authority to the extent these claims do not conflict
with federal authority or section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 253, 47 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West Supp. 1997)
(authorizing the FCC to preempt local or state laws or regulations that act as a barrier to

competition).
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were not plenary.' The Authors believe these actions jeopardize Congress's
vision, misconstrue the statutory scheme, and are not in accord with precedent and sound statutory analysis.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FCC JURISDICTION: HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT

A.

Pre-1934ICC Jurisdiction

Although today it is a well-settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that the Commerce Clause is a source for federal government regulation and oversight of industry affairs, federal agency jurisdiction over interstate commerce often has been at 12the center of the debate over the proper
balance of federal and state power. Pursuant to the authority granted by the
Commerce Clause, Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887.13 The 1910 Mann-Elkins Act, an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, brought the communications industry under federal
regulatory authority by vesting the ICC with jurisdiction over the interstate
rates charged by "telegraph, telephone and cable companies."' 4
Although the ICC had been established at a time when the Commerce
Clause was interpreted narrowly, the 1914 Supreme Court decision in
Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate

11. See, e.g., Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
clarified on reh'g by 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State
Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998) (No. 97-1072). In its Supreme Court brief arguing that Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of
payphone rates with section 276 of the 1996 Act, the Virginia State Corporation Commission pointed out that "[h]ad Congress, in enacting § 276, intended to preempt state regulation.., it would have used the same explicit 'notwithstanding § 2(b)' language that it used
in 1990 and 1993 when enacting §§ 225 and 332... "The Court let stand the D.C. Circuit
decision upholding FCC jurisdiction, even in the absence of an amendment to §2(b).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, amended in part by
Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat, 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)). An understanding of the jurisdictional development
of the Interstate Commerce Commission is helpful in understanding the Commission's
statutory authority. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Artists Payphone Corp., 852 F.
Supp. 221, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that because "the Communications Act was modelled on the Interstate Commerce Act, decisions construing the latter are persuasive in establishing the meaning of the former").
14. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910), repealed
by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 and Supp. 1997)). The reference to cable companies in
the Mann-Elkins Act refers to the offering of telegraph and telephone service via submarine
cable systems.
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Case)'5 established the far-reaching scope of permissible federal ICC regulation. The Shreveport Rate Case involved a challenge to the power of the ICC
to regulate the intrastate rates charged by railway carriers to prevent discrimination against interstate transport. The ICC had established maximum
rates for railway transport from Shreveport, Louisiana into Texas after having found that the rates being charged unjustly discriminated against interstate carriers. Although the carriers did not object to the establishment of
rates for interstate transportation, they did oppose the ICC order that they
cease charging lower rates for intrastate hauls "from cities in Texas to such
points under substantially similar conditions and circumstances"'' 6 so as to
give "an unlawful and undue preference and advantage 17 to intrastate shipments.
Recognizing the need to establish plenary federal power over interstate
commerce,'8 the Court delineated the scope of federal jurisdiction before addressing the authority of the ICC to promulgate specific interstate rate regulations. Although the rates for intrastate transportation were lower than the
interstate rates set by the Commission, the Court reasoned that:
[t]he fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, as well
as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the complete and
paramount authority of Congress over the latter or preclude the Federal
power from being exerted to prevent the intrastate operations of such
carriers from being made19 a means of injury to that which has been
confided to Federal care.
In describing the basis for this expansive view of federal power, the Court
explained that permitting state regulation to interfere with federal regulation
would mean that "Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional
authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field. ' 2 While recognizing the inability of Congress to "regulate the

15. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry., 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
16. Id. at 347.
17. Id.

18. The Court stated:
Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local
governments. The purpose was to make impossible the recurrence of the evils
which had overwhelmed the Confederation and to provide the necessary basis of
national unity by insuring "uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state legislation." By virtue of the comprehensive terms of the grant,
the authority of Congress is at all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies
that arise and to protect the national interest by securing the freedom of interstate
commercial intercourse from local control.
Id. at 350-51 (quoting County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880)).
19. Id. at 351.
20. Id. at 352.
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internal commerce of a State," 2' the Court ruled that federal power extended
to "all matters having such a close and substantialrelationto interstate traffic .....
2,,2 Removing all doubt about the implications of its holding, the
Court stated that the authority of Congress was paramount even though
3
2
"intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may thereby be controlled."
Having solidly established federal authority over the intrastate rates in
question, the Court then addressed the scope of authority granted to the ICC
by Congress. This analysis considered whether Congress had exercised the
full mandate of its power to authorize the ICC to prescribe the challenged
rate regulations. Although the Court found that a strict reading
of the statu24
tory language was inconclusive as to congressional intent, the legislative
history revealed that Congress had recognized that "'the paramount evil
chargeable against the operation of the transportation system of the United
States as now conducted is unjust discrimination between persons, places,
commodities, or particular descriptions of traffic."'2 From its examination of
the legislative history, the Court determined that the "'underlying purpose
and aim of the measure is the prevention of these discriminations."' 6 Based
on these findings, the Court ruled that the ICC had acted within its grant of
authority 27 in finding that "unjust discrimination existed under substantially
similar conditions of transportation .... ,,
Sixteen years after establishing the breadth of the federal commerce
power over the regulation of common instrumentalities of intra- and interstate commerce in the Shreveport Rate Case, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the scope of ICC authority over the telephone industry.

21. Id. at 353.
22. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). "Congress in the exercise of its paramount power may
prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse
from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce." Id.
24. Id. at 355-56. The Act provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to
any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
Id. (quoting Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380).
25. Id. at 356 (quoting S. REP. No. 49-46, at 215 (1886)).
26. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 49-46, at 215 (1886)).
27. Id. at 360 ("It was recognized at the beginning that the Nation could not prosper if
interstate and foreign trade were governed by many masters, and, where the interests of the
freedom of interstate commerce are involved, the judgment of Congress and of the agencies
it lawfully establishes must control.").
28. Id. at 358.
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Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. involved a challenge to the state com-

mission's authority to prescribe regulations in the face of an ICC decision to
require a uniform system of depreciation accounting for telephone equipment. In rejecting the state's argument that the ICC had exceeded its jurisdiction, the Court found the ICC regulations proper and focused on the
method that had been used to apportion property, revenues, and expenses
between the intrastate and interstate aspects of the business to ensure that
each aspect fell to the appropriate regulatory authority.30 In decrying the
lower court's failure to separate the intrastate and interstate aspects, the
Court stated that "[t]he proper regulation of rates can be had only by maintaining the limits of state and federal jurisdiction, and this cannot be accomplished unless there are findings of fact underlying the conclusions reached
with respect to the exercise of each authority." 31 The Court remanded the
case to the lower court to apportion the revenues and expenses; the decision
foreshadowed intra- and interstate separations analysis that would define
federalism in U.S. common carrier telephone regulation for the rest of the
century.

B.

The CommunicationsAct of 1934: Dual Jurisdictionand the
Road to LouisianaPSC-A DefinitionalDestination

Prompted by the lobbying efforts of state regulators and President
Franklin Roosevelt's desire to bring telephone and broadcasting regulation
under the same jurisdiction,32 Congress passed the Communications Act of
1934 (1934 Act).33 During the legislative process leading up to the enactment
of the 1934 Act, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) lobbied relentlessly for language to be included in the
29. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), enforced by Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. IM.1933), rev'd sub nom. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,

292 U.S. 151 (1934).
30. "The separation of the intrastate and interstate property, revenues and expenses of
the Company is important not simply as a theoretical allocation to two branches of the business. It is essential to the appropriate recognition of the competent governmental authority
in each field of regulation." Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 149.
32. Carolyn Whitworth Malanga, Note, Californiav. Federal Communications Commission: Continuing the Struggle Between Sections 151 and 152 of the Communications
Act, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 893, 904 (1991). President Roosevelt explained that the FCC

should have the authority "now lying with the Federal Radio Commission and with such
authority over communications as now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commission-the
services affected to be all those which rely on wires, cables, or radio as a medium of transmission." PRESENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, S. Doc. No. 73-144
(1934).
33. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)).
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1934 Act that would prevent the FCC from using a Shreveport rationale to
regulate aspects of intrastate telephone services. 34 As a result of these efforts,
sections 1 and 2(a) of the 1934 Act simultaneously endow the FCC35 with
jurisdiction over "interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio ' '36 while section 2(b) prohibits the Commission from regulating "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for
or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of
any carrier ....
In an attempt to unleash the national economic power of
the telephone while responding to the political concerns of the states, Congress created a dual regulatory scheme in which the FCC oversees the development of a "rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide"3 interstate
communications network while declaring intrastate communications services
beyond the reach of federal authority.
The 1934 Act codified a dual jurisdictional scheme. The regulatory
boundaries ostensibly were drawn such that state or federal regulators usually would act only within their respective spheres of competence. Ever since
the passage of the 1934 Act, the FCC has attempted to navigate tricky waters-keeping its hands on the rudder of section l's mandate to set a national
telecommunications policy while steering clear of the state regulatory matters declared "off limits" by section 2(b). For the first fifty years of the
Communications Act of 1934, however, courts placed very few judicial

34. Malanga, supra note 32, at 905.
35. Section 1 reads:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for
the purpose of national defense, and for the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to
several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and
foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is hereby created a
commission to be known as the "Federal Communications Commission", which
shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce
the provisions of this Act.
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
151).
36. Section 2(a) provides: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to all interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio .... IId. § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. 152(a)).
37. As originally enacted, section 2(b) read: "Subject to the provisions of section 301,
nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with
respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service of any carrier .... IId. § 2(b), 48 Stat. at
1065; see also section 2(b) as amended, infra note 42.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
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3
limitations on the scope of FCC preemption of any state action. 9 Signifi40
cantly, in its 1976 Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) decision, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's preemption of state certification requirements for all
private dispatch radio systems without regard to whether services provided
by such operators typically crossed state borders. The court based its reasoning on a finding that SMR could not be classified as common carriage
4
because it did not share all elements of the definition of such services. ' The
definitional approach taken by the FCC and upheld by the court removed
state substantive jurisdiction over any communications aspect of SMR.42

39. In the decade preceding the landmark Louisiana Public Service Commission v.
FCC,476 U.S. 355 (1986) decision (see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text), courts
consistently gave the FCC considerable latitude in executing its regulatory function. See,
e.g., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 792 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1027 (1976) (upholding an FCC declaratory ruling asserting federal jurisdiction over
connection of nontelephone company provided customer premises equipment (CPE) to
public networks by stating that section 2(b) precludes federal intervention only in areas
"that in their nature and effect are separable from and do not substantially affect the conduct
or development of interstate communications"); North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552
F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (holding that the FCC could properly preempt state regulations barring or interfering with CPE use); California v. FCC, 567
F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978) (upholding FCC regulation of
facilities physically located entirely within the territory of a single state where the facilities
were simultaneously used for both intrastate and interstate purposes and it was "technically
and practically difficult to separate the two types of communications"); Computer and
Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983) (affirming FCC preemption of state CPE and enhanced services regulation).
40. NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. National Ass'n of
Radio Tel. Sys. v. FCC, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
41. A carrier "will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make individualized
decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal" or where it lacks a "quasipublic character." NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641. The 1993 Act classified interconnected SMR
operators as common carriers.
42. In 1982 Congress amended section 331 (which later became section 332) to codify
the SMR decision:
Sec. 331(c)
(1) For purposes of this section, private land mobile service shall include service
provided by specialized mobile radio...
(2) A person engaged in private land mobile service shall not, insofar as such
person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrierfor any purpose under this
Act....
(3) No State or local government shall have any authority to impose any rate or
entry regulation upon any private land mobile service, except that nothing in this
subsection may be construed to impair such jurisdiction with respect to common
carrier stations in the mobile service.
Communications Amendments Act of 1982-National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 120(a), 96 Stat. 1087, 1096-97 (emphasis
added).
Consequently, under the Commission's regulatory framework and Congress's 1981
amendments wholly "intrastate" communications on SMR networks were subject to federal,
not state, regulatory authority. It should be noted as well that the term "rate and entry" was
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Stated somewhat differently, these services were no longer subject to FCC
jurisdiction under Title II or comparable state statutes enacted pursuant to
state authority provided by section 2(b). The state of FCC preemption law
just prior to 1986 has been characterized as follows:
[T]he FCC could preempt multijurisdictional use of facilities if it was
simply "difficult" to separate the inter- and intrastate communications
flowing over them, and mere "frustration" of federal objectives could
constitute a "substantial effect" upon federal jurisdiction supporting
preemption of intrastate communications as an independent ground
(irrespective of whether43inter- and intrastate communications could be
separated in some way).
The Commission's then-current practice of reading certain services
outside of its-and by implication the states'-Title II or common carrier
jurisdiction had been very successful. However, the Supreme Court's 1986
LouisianaPublic Service Commission v. FCC decision redesigned the landscape of FCC preemption of state common carrier regulation. The Court
looked anew at the jurisdictional tension inherent in the 1934 Act and reinterpreted the scope of the FCC's preemptive power. The Court shifted the
analytical focus away from federal policy objectives such as competition and
toward a stricter reading of the language contained in the Act and an investigation of the scope of the Commission's authority as defined by Congress in
its laws. As the LouisianaPSC Court explained:
While it is certainly true, and a basic underpinning of our federal system, that state regulation will be displaced to the extent that it stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress, it is also true that a federal agency may
pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority.... Section 152(b) constitutes...
a congressional denial of power to the FCC to require state commissions to follow
FCC depreciation practices for intrastate ratemaking
45
purposes.

used as a statutory shorthand for common carrier regulation. Cf.infra Part II.C.1. These
substantive amendments preempting state authority took effect notwithstanding Congress's
failure to amend section 2(b) at the time. We will show conclusively that use of this term in
the 1993 amendments does not narrow the scope of Congress's preemption.
In 1992, Congress renumbered the section. "Section 331 of such Act as added by
Public Law 97-259 (47 U.S.C. § 332) is redesignated as section 332." Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 25(b), 106 Stat.
1502 (1992).
43. Michael J. Zpevak, FCC Preemption After Louisiana PSC, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.
185, 190 (1993). For a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of preemption jurisprudence involving the FCC prior to the Louisiana PSC decision, see Richard McKenna, Preemption Under the CommunicationsAct, 37 FED. COMM. L. J. 1 (1985).
44. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
45. Id. at 374.
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While the LouisianaPSC decision is universally seen as reining in FCC
authority, its principal holding is that the Court and the Commission, including state commissions, are bound by legislative definitions of the Com46
mission's authority. To apply the Louisiana PSC reasoning in context of
the mobile services industry, just as Congress could deny FCC power in section 152(b), Congress could endow the FCC with the exclusive authority to
regulate certain services. 47 Conscious of the Court's definitional emphasis
and the difficulties experienced by the mobile services industry at the state
level, Congress did exactly that by further amending section 332 of the Act
and section 2(b) in 1993. In doing so, Congress explicitly bestowed nationwide authority on the FCC to regulate the mobile services industry that Congress found to be inherently interstate.
C.

The Omnibus Budget ReconciliationAct of 1993: Displacement
of State RegulatoryAuthority

During the 1980s many recently licensed cellular service providers encountered state regulatory and local telephone company practices that were
harmful to the development of the industry. 4s As Congress became more
aware of the barriers to entry and obstacles to growth presented by state
regulation, it moved toward providing unequivocal federal authority to the
FCC to foster development of this unique wireless medium.
The key to understanding the jurisdictional struggles over state-federal
tension built into the 1934 Communications Act lies in recognizing the competitive potential of wireless technology and the federal licensing scheme
found in Title II of the 1934 Act. Traditional telephone regulatory principles

46. Following the LouisianaPSC decision, the FCC encountered a number of preemption defeats in the courts of appeal. For example, three years after LouisianaPSC, the D.C.
Circuit also restricted the scope of FCC jurisdiction when it held that FCC preemption of
state regulation would be proper "only to the extent that such regulation negates the federal
policy of ensuring a competitive market in [the service to be regulated]." NARUC v. FCC,
880 F.2d 422, 431 (1989); see also California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990)
(reversing three FCC orders), vacated in part, 39 F.3d 919, cert. denied sub nom. New
York v. FCC, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995).
47. As the Louisiana PSCCourt noted:
In deciding these cases, it goes without saying that we do not assess the wisdom
of the asserted federal policy of encouraging competition within the telecommunications industry. Nor do we consider whether the FCC should have the authority to enforce, as it sees fit, practices which it believes would best effectuate this
purpose.... [O]ur task is simply to determine where Congress has placed the responsibility ....
LouisianaPSC,476 U.S. at 359.
48. See infra notes 189-227 and accompanying text. Monopoly telephone carriers, for
example, refused to interconnect at reasonable prices, and delayed providing telephone
numbers to cellular and paging competitors, among other things.
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are rooted in the monopolistic origins of landline telephony-the view that
wireline operators control an essential bottleneck facility that operates as a
monopoly. In the old Bell System framework, protecting the "public interest" meant using the state's power to monitor and support a communications
monopoly. Many commentators have documented that averaged rates, alleged implicit subsidies, and an abundance of social policies were built into
telephone industry pricing.
When cellular radio technology appeared, its prospects were markedly
different. Wireless telephony sprang from a competitive environment that
had its origins in spectrum allocation decisions that contemplated multiple
carriers. 49 Its technology was inherently different, too. Instead of massive
wire and cable infrastructure and easily drawn distinctions between in-state
and interstate calls, wireless networks employ distributed cell sites. Wireless
calls by nature are "on the move" and difficult to fit into the traditional categories. With this new medium, "the public interest" has always meant championing deregulatory and competitive policies to the benefit of both consumers and business, particularly because mobile radio provided a valuable
service. The wireless industry attempted for years to thrive in a nether zone
of the old regulatory paradigm, even as landline telephony underwent an enforced but often bitterly opposed migration toward increased competition.
However, it became evident to Congress that the wireless paradigm needed
statutory support to reach its potential. Congress recognized the fundamental
uniqueness of CMRS by enacting a separate federal regulatory framework
designed to advance the public interest in a new way: by encouraging national competition unfettered by onerous state or federal regulation.
1.

Sections 2(b) and 332 Shift of CMRS Jurisdiction to the FCC

The drafters of the 1993 Amendments intended a regulatory scheme
applicable to CMRS that would "foster the growth and development of mobile services that, by their nature, operate without regardto state lines as an
integral part of the nationaltelecommunications infrastructure ....
To ensure the achievement of this national goal of CMRS "growth and

49. The FCC's first cellular orders of 1981 and 1982 designated two carriers per market, while its 1992 PCS Order allowed six carriers per market. See Inquiry into the Use of
the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Comm. Sys., Report and Order, 86
F.C.C.2d 469, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 809 (1981) (proceeding terminated), reconsidered
by Memorandum Opinion and OrderOn Reconsideration,89 F.C.C.2d 58, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1673 (1982) (proceeding terminated); Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish New Personal Comm. Servs., Tentative Decision and Memorandum Opinion and
Order,7 FCC Rcd. 7794, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 683 (1992).
50. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587
(emphasis added).
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development," Congress explicitly endowed the FCC with exclusive jurisdiction over wireless regulation and simultaneously acknowledged the inherently interstate nature of the industry. The 103d Congress used section 6002
of the 1993 Act to revise section 332 2 and section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, thereby abolishing the interstate/intrastate dichotomy for
CMRS and "establish[ing] a Federalregulatory framework to govern the offering of all commercial mobile services."53

a.

The Substantive Grant-Section332

Recognizing that it is neither practical nor desirable to disentangle the
intrastate segments of CMRS from its interstate nature, Congress enacted
section 332(c)(3) of the Communications Act, which begins:
"Notwithstanding sections 152(b) and 221(b) of this title, no State or local
government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates
charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service ....
In effect, the congressional amendments to the Communications Act in
1993 combined the original section 332 removal of all state jurisdiction with
an expansion of federal power and a direction to the FCC to forbear from
regulation if forbearance is in the public interest. Initially, the FCC exercised
this authority boldly. For example, by August 8, 1994, eight states had filed
petitions to retain their authority to regulate intrastate CMRS rates. 55 However, these petitions were rejected by the Commission,5 Which ruled in favor
51. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b), 107
Stat. 312, 392 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 332 (1994)).
52. Section 332(c) is entitled "Regulatory treatment of mobile services." 47 U.S.C. §
332(c) (1994).
53. H.R. REP.No. 103-213, at 490 (1993) (emphasis added).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
55. Petition of Pub. Utils. Comm'n, State of Haw., for Authority To Extend Its Rate
Reg. of Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. in the State of Haw., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 2359,
para. 2 (1995).
56. See, e.g., Petition on Behalf of the La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n for Authority To Retain
Existing Jurisdiction over Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. Offered Within the State of
La., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7898, Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 326 (1995); Petition of
the People of the State of Cal. and the Pub. Utils. Comm'n of the State of Cal. To Retain
Reg. Authority over Intrastate Cellular Serv. Rates, Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC
Rcd. 796, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1157 (1995); Petition of N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Conun'n
To Extend Rate Reg., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8187, 78 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 251
(1995); see also Petition of Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Report and Orderand Order on Reconsideration,10 FCC Rcd. 7824, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 308 (1995); Petition on Behalf of
the State of Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n, for Authority to Extend its Rate Reg. of Commercial
Mobile Radio Servs. in the State of Haw., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7872 (1995);
Petition of the State of Ohio for Authority To Continue To Regulate Commercial Mobile
Radio Servs., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3379 (1995).
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of a single federal regulatory policy for the wireless industry. 57 While the
FCC was given the authority to regulate the mobile services industry, the
statute and the FCC's implementing orders58 also established a basis for the
Commission to forbear from regulation when less government action might
engender more competition.59
b.

FCCExpress Jurisdictionover LEC Interconnectionwith
CMRS: Section 332(c)(1)(B)

Section 332 also contains an explicit grant of federal authority over the
interconnection between local exchange carriers and CMRS providers. The
legislative history of this section states that it was included in the bill because: "[tfhe Committee considers the right to interconnect an important one
which the Commission shall seek to promote, since interconnection
serves to
6
enhance competition and advance a seamless national network." 0
This express grant provides further support for the view that Congress
intended to provide a singularly federal CMRS regulatory framework
through the interplay of the changes to both sections 332 and 2(b).
In its 1996 local competition decision, the FCC explicitly acknowledged its jurisdiction over CMRS but deferred determining the precise scope
of its authority. "We acknowledge that section 332 in tandem with section
201 is a basis for jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection; we simply
decline to define the precise extent of that jurisdiction at this time.",6 1 This
specific question was soon resoundingly answered by the Eighth Circuit in
Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC2 (Iowa Utilities) which found comprehensive
jurisdiction sufficient to establish rules to promote the CMRS industry in
general and interconnection rules in particular.
In the Iowa Utilities case, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the
57. Only those states exercising regulatory authority over CMRS were able to petition
the FCC to maintain that authority. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(B).
58. See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm.
Act of 1996, Third Order on Reconsideration on FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking,
12 FCC Rcd. 12,460, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1206 (1997); Implementation of Sections 3(n)
and 332 of the Comm. Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order on PartialReconsideration
of Second Report and Order, I1 FCC Rcd. 19,729, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1302 (1996).
59. See, e.g., Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Comm. Act, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 835 (1994); Further Forbearance from Title II Reg. for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers,
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 2164 (1994).
60. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
61. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 16,005, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1996) [hereinafter Local Competition FirstReport and Order].
62. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
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FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating pricing rules for intercon-

63
nection with incumbent local exchange providers under the 1996 Act. Pur-

suant to this authority, 64 the FCC promulgated rules governing the pricing of
all interconnection between local exchange carriers and new market entrants.6 Initially, the FCC's move into the traditional realm of state regulation caused state commissions and incumbent local exchange carriers to
challenge the rules in court and to file a successful motion to stay the implementation of the rules. 6 However, the court foreshadowed its eventual decision in the case by agreeing to lift the stay only as it applied to interconnection between local exchange providers and CMRS providers. The Eighth
Circuit's order lifting the stay only as to CMRS demonstrates an understanding of not only expansive FCC jurisdiction over CMRS providers, but
also of the diminished state jurisdiction over the CMRS industry. Although
the Eighth Circuit struck down the FCC's interconnection orders that sprang
from the new authority provided to the FCC to promote local competition by
the 1996 Act, the court upheld the validity of the FCC's jurisdiction as applied to CMRS providers.
c.

Section 2(b) Eliminationof JurisdictionalBar Save for "Other
Terms and Conditions"

To remove any doubt about FCC or federal jurisdiction over CMRS,
Congress not only added express provisions to section 332, but also amended
section 2(b) of the Communications Act-the statutory source for all state
authority over communications common carriers.6 8 As revised in 1993, section 2(b) maintains the states' pre-existing intrastate jurisdictional authority,
except with regard to "interstate mobile radio communication service or ra63. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
64. The Eighth Circuit held the FCC's exercise of this authority was inappropriate with
respect to non-CMRS common carriers. However, the court specifically upheld the FCC's
broad scope of authority as applied to the wireless industry. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 800. The Authors believe the Eighth Circuit
penetrated to the essence of Congress's intent in the 1993 Act. For a number of reasons too
complex to address in this Article, fault can be found with the court's analysis of the 1996
Act provisions. See Petition for Cert. of the United States, Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753
(8th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-826 et al.).
65. Local Competition FirstReport and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 1; see also Motion To Lift Stay of Airtouch, Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (96-3321
et al.); Iowa Utils. Bd., Nos. 96-3321 et al. (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1996) (Order Lifting Stay in
Part) <http://Ils.wustl.edu/8th.cir/FCC/Opinions/FCC?963221.019>.
66. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 117
S. Ct. 378 (1996).
67. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 800 n.21; see also Iowa Public Utilities discussion
infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994); see also supraPart IH.C.1.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

dio communication service to mobile stations on land vehicles." 69
This amendment stands out as particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, without the jurisdictional limitations enunciated in section
2(b), the Communications Act of 1934 places virtually unlimited authority
over intrastate telecommunications in the FCC's hands. As the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded in its pivotal Louisiana PSC decision, 70 the legislative history of section 2(b) reveals that state regulators forced the insertion of the
71
section in response to the Court's decision in the Shreveport Rate Case,
which upheld the ICC's authority to order increases in intrastate railroad
rates if those rates had a discriminatory effect on interstate carriers.72 The
Supreme Court in Louisiana PSC found, however, that section 2(b) was not
aimed at allocating jurisdiction of only rate issues. Instead, Congress drafted
that section to cover the most basic and far-reaching issues "for or in connection with, intrastate communication services. 73
In limiting state authority over mobile radio communications through
its amendment of section 2(b), the 103d Congress in effect invoked the
Shreveport-eradoctrine, with all of its implications for federal-state regulation, to establish federal Commission jurisdiction over mobile radio services.
Since 1934, section 2(b) had "fenced off' intrastate common carrier services
from the exercise of FCC jurisdiction and reserved intrastate regulatory
power to the states. 74 The Supreme Court, in Louisiana PSC, affirmed that
section 2(b) gives state regulators jurisdiction over the parts of intrastate
telecommunications that can be severed from the interstate portions or are
not in conflict with federal policies 75 By 1993, Congress, well aware of the
Louisiana PSC interpretation of section 2(b), 76 expressly amended this
statutory "fence" to specify that the intended boundaries of its regulatory
framework for CMRS were national. The law's revised wording states that:

69. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3). The Conference Report accompanying the legislation states
that the accompanying amendment to section 2(b) was made to "clarify that the Commission has the authority to regulate commercial mobile services." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103213, at 497 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 864, 1186.
70. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
71. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
72. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Shreveport Rate Case era.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
74. See California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986); California v. FCC, 567
F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118
S. Ct. 879 (1998).
75. LouisianaPSC, 476 U.S. at 372-76 (1986).
76. The Court noted that the main clause of 2(b) is itself a rule of statutory construction
that "presents its own specific instructions regarding the correct approach to the statute
which applies to how we should read § 220." Id. at 376 n.5.
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"Except as provided in... section 332 ....nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to (1)
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any
carrer ....77
Thus, the revision of section 2(b) contained in the 1993 Act expressly
provides that the traditional reservation of state authority over intrastate
services does not extend to those services insofar as they are covered by section 332; that is, state authority does not extend to CMRS because it is the
subject matter of section 332, which establishes an exclusively federal jurisdictional scheme. This section also shows that, contrary to some recent interpretations, 78 the 1993 Act's "fencing out" of state jurisdiction does not
merely encompass CMRS "rates and entry." Instead, Congress intended the
FCC to have jurisdiction over wireless "charges, classifications, practices,
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio"-leaving very little territory for the
state regulators to legally "fence in." In fact, all that is left for states under
the law are "other terms and conditions. 79

d.

Limitation on State UniversalService Programs

The portion of section 332 applicable to the goal of "universal service"80 also reveals Congress's cognizance of the necessity of a national
77. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., PittencrieffOrder, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041 (1997).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
By "terms and conditions," the Committee intends to include such matters as
customer billing information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer protection matters; facilities siting issues (e.g. zoning); transfers of control;
the bundling of services and equipment; and the requirement that carriers make
capacity available on a wholesale basis or such other matters as fall within a
state's lawful authority. This list is intended to be illustrative only and not meant
to preclude other matters generally understood to fall under "terms and conditions."
H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
80. Congress defined "universal service" in the 1996 Act as follows:
Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the
Commission shall establish periodically under this section, taking into account
advances in telecommunications and information technologies and services. The
Joint Board in recommending, and the Commission in establishing, the definition
of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms shall consider the extent to which such telecommunications services-(A)
are essential to education, public health, or public safety; (B) have, through the
operation of market choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial
majority of residential customers; (C) are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers; and (D) are consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity.
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regulatory scheme for mobile service providers. The universal service exception contained in section 332(c)(3)(A) for CMRS reads as follows:
Nothing in this subparagraph [Section 332(c)(3)] shall exempt providers of commercial mobile service (where such services are a substitute
for land line telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the
communications within such State) from requirements imposed by a
State commission on all providers of telecommunications services necessary to ensure the universal
availability of telecommunications serv81
ice at affordable rates.
Thus, where CMRS services are not a substitute for landline telephone
exchange service for most of a state's communications (the current pervasive
reality), Congress intended CMRS providers to be exempt from intrastate
universal service obligations. 82 In envisioning the possibility that CMRS
might one day serve as a substitute for traditional local landline service,
Congress provided for the possibility that state universal service programs or
other state funding obligations might apply. In addition, the 1993 amendment to section 2(b), eliminated any "intrastate" category of CMRS service
that could be covered by an intrastate universal service program. CMRS is
now jurisdictionally interstate, and so it will remain unless Congress revises
its present status.
The Universal Service Report and Order 3 adopted by the Commission
pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 established a federal fund
for the support of universal service and acknowledged that states may establish state funds to support universal service. The Commission also ruled that
CMRS providers may be required to contribute to support state and federal
universal service programs. However, the Universal Service Report and
Order (and subsequent orders on reconsideration) fails to give effect to the
statutory provisions that distinguish CMRS providers from other providers
of telecommunications services. Instead, the Commission has adopted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 254(c), 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(c) (West Supp.
1997).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
82. See Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 564 (D.C. Cir.), clarified
on reh'g by 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State Corp.
Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1997) (No. 97-1072); Pole Attachments
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 35 (1978) (amending Communications Act of 1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224). But see Universal Serv. Report and Order, 12
FCC Rcd. 8776, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997); PittencrieffOrder,9 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1041 (1997). In both section 276 of the 1996 Act and the Pole Attachment Act, Congress
modified the FCC's jurisdiction. This modified jurisdiction was exercised without any express amendment to section 2(b) of the Communications Act. In redefining the boundaries
of FCC jurisdiction over CMRS providers in section 332, Congress made its intent even
more explicit by taking the overt step of expressly changing section 2(b).
83. UniversalServ. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109.
84. Id. para. 791.
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view that states have authority over CMRS for purposes of establishing and
administering state universal service programs. Under a comprehensive
reading of the entire statute, however, while wireless providers may be required to support universal service programs, the legal framework established by Congress permits only the Commission to impose such requirements.
In drawing a distinction between CMRS and landline local telephone
service, Congress expressly chose to exempt CMRS providers from stateimposed universal service obligations. Although the 1996 Act specifically
empowered the Commission to adopt universal service rules for interstate
services, it did not authorize states to impose similar requirements upon
CMRS providers. Under Congress's approach, CMRS operators would not
escape the obligation to contribute to the support of universal service. They
would, however, participate through a unitary federal mechanism rather than
subject themselves to a patchwork of fifty varying state mechanisms. Congress specified this approach because, as reflected in the 1993 Act, it recognized that jurisdictional separations of traffic on mobile networks would be
administratively burdensome, costly, and complex, given that mobile wireless networks will at any one moment have a constantly changing mix of
calls within and across state boundaries.
The 1996 Act did not change this approach. In the 1996 Act Congress
adopted section 254(f), which states:
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the Commission's
rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications services
shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, in a
manner determined by the State85to the preservation and advancement
of universal service in that State.
The Commission has interpreted this language as providing that states
may require CMRS providers to contribute to state universal service plans. 6
However, the Commission has supplied scant reasoning or analysis for this
interpretation except to say that the Joint Board on Universal Service and the
California PUC87 adopted that interpretation. The Commission agrees with
them, but it does not say why. With respect to another similarly unsupported
Commission directive, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum85. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(f).
86. Universal Serv. Report and Order,12 FCC Rcd. 8776, para. 791, 7 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 109.
87. The FCC noted that California has required CMRS providers to contribute to the
state's programs for Lifeline and high-cost small companies since January 1, 1995. Universal Serv. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, para 791, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109
(citing Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, Order, 56
C.P.U.C.2d 117, 290 (Cal. P.U.C. 1994) (No. 94-09-065)).
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bia said, "[t]he FCC's ipse dixit conclusion, coupled with its failure to respond to contrary arguments resting on solid data, epitomizes arbitrary and
capricious decisionmaking."'88
In addition, exposing CMRS providers to state universal service levies
undermines the public interest. In some less developed countries, mobile
telephones are being used as a substitute for landline telephone service.
Wireless services could eventually become a viable substitute for landline
telephone service in some areas of this country, particularly in rural areas. It
is impossible to predict when CMRS will become a substitute for local wireline service. As it exists today, however, CMRS in the United States is not a
substitute for wireline telephone service.
So far, recent events indicate that a number of states may apply extraordinarily high universal service levies that will impair the growth of the
industry. Kansas, for example, issued a decision in December 1996 that proposed a univeisal service levy on all intrastate retail revenues of CMRS providers amounting to 14.1% per year. 9° Such levies will push rates upwards.
California
has established a seven percent levy on telecommunications reve9'
nues. If two adjacent states adopted assessment rates that differ as much as
California and Kansas, users in low levy states could find their rates indirectly affected by their neighbors' higher levy.
To date, the Commission has issued a total of four reconsideration orders in response to various objections and requests for reconsideration since
its first Universal Service Order.92 In its latest reconsideration order, the
88. Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 564 (D.C. Cir.), clarified on
reh'g by 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v.
FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1997) (No. 97-1072).
89. A recent report of the International Telecommunications Union (1TU), an United
Nations intergovernmental organization, found that cellular telephony is now used as a
"substitute" for, rather than a supplement to, fixed line networks in developing countries
such as China, South Africa, Thailand, Malayasia, Venezuela, Jamaica, Lebanon, Gabon,
Colombia, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and the Philippines. "Substitution typically occurs where
relatively low levels of fixed-line density are combined with competitve mobile cellular
markets." INTERNATIONAL TELEcOMMUNICATION UNION, UNIVERSAL AccEss EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, WORLD TELEcOMMUNICATON DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998, Fig. 3 (Mar. 1998)
<http://www.itu.int./ti/publications/WTDR_98/index.html>; see also Frances Cairncross, A
Connected World, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at S3, S19. The ITU found, for example, that 60% of all telephone subscribers in Cambodia now use mobile cellular. Fixed lines
account for only 25% of Cambodian telephone service with fixed wireless providing the
remainder. Id. at 18.
90. General Investigation into Competition Within the Telecomm. Industry in the State
of Kan., State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., Order,Dkt. No. 190, 492-U 94-GIMT-478-GIT, 36,
para. 111 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Dec. 27, 1996).
91. See Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Decision, No. 96-10-066, available in 1996
WL 651546 (Cal. P.U.C. 1996).
92. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Fourth Report and Order on Reconsid-
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Commission rejected several petitioners' arguments that section
332(c)(3)(A) of the 1996 Act limits a state's ability to impose universal
service contribution requirements on CMRS providers. The Commission
merely restated its conclusion 93 that a state provision requiring CMRS providers to contribute on an equitable nondiscriminatory basis to universal
support mechanisms is a permissible regulation of "other terms and conditions" under section 332(c)(3)(A) rather than rate or entry regulation. The
Commission also reaffirmed its interpretation of section 332(c)(3)(A) that
states are not required to find that CMRS is a substitute for landline service
as a prerequisite to imposing universal service support requirements on
wireless providers. The Commission held that the later-enacted section
254(f) requiring all telecommunications carriers that provide intrastate telecommunications to contribute to state programs would trump section
332(c)(3) in the case of any conflict. 94 The Commission rejected the argument that state universal service mechanisms should not apply to CMRS
providers due to wireless services' inherently "interstate" nature without
support. 95
However, the Commission somewhat inconsistently concluded that
CMRS providers should be permitted to recover universal service contributions through rates charged for all CMRS services. In the Commission's
view, section 332(c)(3)'s modification of the "traditional" federal-state relationship in the CMRS context (by prohibiting states from regulating rates for
intrastate CMRS services), permitting recovery through rates on intra- and
interstate commercial mobile services would not constitute an impermissible
intrusion on state rights. The Commission seems to recognize federal displacement of state authority, but seems unwilling to acknowledge that it does
not intrude on state interests. Congress's choice is decisive, and final. To
carry out Congress's expressed intent, at the very least the Commission
should, as a practical matter, provide a simple, straightforward method by
which the Commission and the fifty states can collect CMRS universal
service levies. The Commission also should recognize that above a certain
level, any such levy would constitute a barrier to entry in violation of section

eration,CC Dkt. No. 96-45, 1997 WL 797523 (Dec. 30, 1997).
93. See infra notes 144-57 for a discussion of the PittencrieffOrder.

94. As we have discussed earlier, the 1993 amendment to section 2(b) removed any
substantive state regulatory authority. Consequently, there are no intrastate CMRS telecommunications for these purposes.
95. In response to this interpretation by the FCC that section 254(f) supersedes section
332(c)(3), several CMRS providers recently filed a joint brief in the upcoming Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals review of Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC. Joint Brief of

Intervenors, Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1998) (Nos. 9760421 and consolidated cases) (consolidation of challenges to the PittencriefOrder).
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253 of the 1996 Act.

D. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Three years after the passage of the 1993 Act, Congress turned to the
broader communications landscape in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Its main objective was to overhaul the regulations and laws affecting the
provision of local telecommunications service in the United States. In mandating sweeping regulatory changes for the industry, Congress explicitly
maintained the Commission's CMRS authority under section 2(a) and section 332(c)(3) and turned its legislative attention in the 1996 Act to the entrenched local monopolies held by incumbent local exchange carriers. 96 Also
in the 1996 Act, as discussed above, Congress adopted the specific universal
service provision in section 254(f) for the purpose of ensuring continued
availability of affordably priced essential telecommunications services and
ultimately advanced services to U.S. consumers.
However, nothing in the 1996 Act undercuts the "hog tight, horse high,
and bull strong" 97 federal regulatory CMRS framework predicated upon
amended section 2(b) and section 332 that we have described. In fact, section
601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act states that Congress did not intend to amend existing law, such as the 1993 Act. Congress provided: "This Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such
Act or amendments." 98
96. As Representative Jack Fields noted after the passage of the 1993 Act and at the
early stages of the legislative process for the 1996 Act:
Last year we began the process of building a national telecommunications infrastructure when we adopted a regulatory framework for wireless services built on
the same concepts contained in [the 1993 Act]. Today we will take the next step
in the process of crafting a national telecommunications policy as we turn our attention to other sectors of the telecommunications industry.
To Supersede the Modification of FinalJudgment EnteredAugust 24, 1982, in the Antitrust
Action Styled United States v. Western Electric, Civil Action No. 82-0192, United States
District Courtfor the Districtof Columbia To Amend the CommunicationsAct of 1934 To
Regulate the Manufacturing of Bell Operating Companies, andfor other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 3626 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Financeof the House
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 117 (1993) (statement of Rep. Fields).
The "regulatory framework for wireless services" to which Rep. Fields refers is the federal
one expressly carved out by Congress in the 1993 Act in response to the unique nature of
wireless calls and the opportunities presented by a nationally regulated wireless industry.
See Ex parte letter from Airtouch Comm. re: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Radio Service Providers, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary,
FCC, at 10 (March 20, 1996) (on file with authors).
97. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. grantedsub nom.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
98. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 601(c)(1), 110 Stat.
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In addition, section 253(e) of the 1996 Act (which was a part of section
254 at an earlier stage in the legislative drafting process99) specifically addresses the continued viability of section 332 by stating that "[n]othing in
this section shall affect the application of 332(c)(3) of this title to commercial mobile service providers."'0 In addition to these explicit provisions in
the 1996 Act, two principles of statutory interpretation also support the view
that the FCC's jurisdiction over CMRS is complete. First, the repeal of laws
by implication is disfavored; and second, general provisions (e.g., section
254) are subordinate to and must be interpreted in light of more specific provisions (e.g., section 332(c)(3)).
While some may argue that section 251 of the 1996 Act expressly
maintains state power over local calls, the key point to remember is that
Congress took away state power over intrastate CMRS in the 1993 Act, and
did nothing to restore that power in the 1996 Act. Thus, to assert state jurisdiction over CMRS predicated upon the Telecommunications Act, one must
ignore the 1993 Act's explicit authorization of a federal CMRS regulatory
scheme. If Congress had intended to return jurisdiction to the states in the
1996 Act, an explicit provision would have been required to accomplish this
task.

Ill. THE PROBLEMS: MISGUIDED LEGAL ANALYSES AND STATE
REGULATORY BURDENS
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the 1993 Act's amendments to the 1934 Act embody congressional recognition of the need to establish a federal statutory framework that allows the U.S. wireless communications industry to flourish. In practice, however, realization of federal
objectives has been problematic. Unfortunately, some courts and state and
local regulators cling to a belief that the traditional common carrier classification should apply to both wireline and wireless carriers, regardless of their
market penetration and the nature of their services. The misunderstandings
emerging from both of these sources pose serious threats to the realization of
Congress's regulatory objectives for CMRS. These attempts by some courts
and state and local entities to shackle new wireless services to old regulatory
categories not only frustrate the congressional wireless vision, but also hinder the growth of this emerging industry.
56, 143 (appearing as note (c)(1) to 47 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1997)).
99. Both the Senate and House versions of the 1996 Act presented all sections of the
Removal of Barriers to Entry provision as section 254, which included universal service in
subsection 254(b). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 126-27 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 138-39. This section was changed in the House Conference Report to
section 253. Id. at 127, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 138-39.
100. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(e) (West Supp. 1997).
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Thus far, the breadth of this federal regulatory framework has not been
spelled out by the Commission. While the statutory language imposes a presumption that CMRS is common carriage, the Commission could selectively
eliminate many traditional common carrier regulatory requirements imposed
on CMRS. Moreover, a few recent decisions have relied mistakenly on a traditional section 2(b) preemption analysis, rather than a close reading of the
Communications Act amendments of the 1993 Act, to limit the Commission's jurisdictional authority over CMRS. The failure of the FCC to frame
properly and directly address the unique legal status of CMRS thwarts
achievement of congressional goals and the prospects for the industry's domestic growth.
A.

Conflicting Court and Commission Decisions

One of the first opportunities to address the scope of FCC authority
over CMRS providers arose in Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control v. FCC.'0 ' The dispute that gave rise to the litigation is rooted in the
FCC's 1995 decision to deny the state public utility commission's petition to
regulate the rates charged by commercial mobile service providers operating
within the state.'°2 The state commission, while acknowledging the FCC's
grant of authority to determine whether "'market conditions with respect to
[CMRS] services fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates,"' alleged that the FCC was bound to follow the explicit
factors enunciated in its Second CMRS order. In essence, the state commission claimed that because the list of factors did not specifically include
the "present-day impact of future market entry" in evaluating current market
conditions, the FCC was precluded from considering this as a factor in denying Connecticut the ability to continue to regulate intrastate CMRS
rates. 1°4
In confirming the legality of the FCC's actions, the ConnecticutDPUC
court focused on the changes Congress had made to the 1934 Communications Act with the provisions of the 1993 Act so as to "dramatically revise

101. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 78 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
102. Section 332(c)(3)(A) allows a state to petition the FCC for permission to regulate
the rates for CMRS. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994).
103. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 78 F.3d at 846 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(3)(A)(i),(B)). The court stated that the order listed eight types of "'evidence, information, and analysis' as 'pertinent to [its] examination of market conditions and consumer
protection."' Id. (quoting Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications
Act, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, para. 252, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 835
(1994)) (alteration in original).
104. Id. at 850.
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the regulation of the wireless telecommunications industry ... ."'0" The court

identified the importance of the federal regulatory scheme and the necessity
conflicting and "balkanized" state regulations from impeding
of preventing
106
S
this goal. Accordingly, the court, acknowledging the expansive scope of
the FCC authority over the regulation of CMRS providers, concluded that,
although this particular factor had not been listed, it was "entirely appropriate for the Commission to take into account the present-day impact of future
market entry in evaluating whether current market conditions are inadequate
to protect consumers.""
Shortly after the Connecticut DPUC decision, the Connecticut courts,
in Metro Mobile CTS v. ConnecticutDepartmentof Public Utility Control,'0 8
were again called upon to evaluate the propriety of state regulation in light of
the 1993 Act amendments. This case involved a challenge to a state commission decision requiring CMRS providers to contribute to a state universal
service fund established under the universal service provisions adopted in the
1996 Act. Specifically, the court assessed the interplay between the two section 332(c) phrases: (1) "'this paragraph shall not prohibit a state from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.' and
(2):
Nothing in this subparagraph shall exempt providers of commercial mobile services (where such services are a substitute for land line
telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the communications within such state) from requirements imposed by a state commission on all providers of telecommunications services necessary to
availability of telecommunications service at afensure the universal
9
fordable rates.1
Consistent with Metro Mobile, the court placed great emphasis on the
statutory language and the established principle that "rules of statutory construction require that no language in a statute be read to be redundant."" 0
Using these familiar tools of judicial analysis, the court found the correct interpretation of the interplay between the two provisions to be as follows:
Because the former excerpt from the Preemption Clause grants to the
105. Id. at 845.
106. ld. at 846. "'Wile... states have a legitimate interest in protecting the interest of
telecommunications users in their jurisdictions .... competition is a strong protector of
these interests and that state regulation in this context could inadvertently become as [sic] a
burden to the development of this competition."' Id. (quoting Implementation of Sections
3(n) and 332 of the Comm. Act, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, para. 23, 74
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 835 (1994) (alteration in original)).

107. Id. at 850-51.
108. Metro Mobile CTS, Inc., No. CV-95-0051275S, 1996 WL 737480 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
109. Id. at *3 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)).

110. Id.
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states the authority to regulate "other terms and conditions" of cellular
service, the latter excerpt, which expressly exempts from preemption
any assessments for universal and affordable service where cellular
service is a significant substitute for land line service, would be redundant if such assessments were among "other terms and conditions" of
cellular service and thereby already exempt.
Accordingly, the court decided that:
[b]y expressly exempting from preemption those assessments which

are made on cellular providers in a state in which cellular service is a
substitute for land line service, Congress left no ambiguity that cellular
providers in states in which cellular is not a substitute
2 for land line
service fall under the umbrella of federal preemption.14
The court found, therefore, that the 1993 Act amendments prohibited
the state commission from assessing Metro Mobile (a cellular carrier) for
payments to the state Universal Service and Lifeline Programs for interstate
services.
Despite this initial judicial recognition of FCC plenary jurisdiction over
CMRS providers, other decisions have been hostile to the federal program
established by Congress. A review of these decisions reveals that they contain erroneous conclusions drawn from a complex and poorly understood
body of law. This problem has been particularly acute with regard to the application of state universal service obligations to CMRS service providers.
In Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. State Corp. Commission of Kansas,"3 a
U.S. District Court considered the interplay between section 332(c)(3)(A)
and section 254(f) seeking to determine the propriety of requiring CMRS
providers to contribute to a state-sponsored universal service fund in Kansas.114 Broadly stated, the question was whether section 332(c)(3)(A) exempted CMRS providers from the section 254(f) provision allowing states to
require intrastate telecommunications providers to contribute to state universal service funds. The court rejected the petitioners' argument that section
332 prohibits states from requiring CMRS providers to contribute to state
universal service funds"' and held that the preemptive reach of section 332

111. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Mountain Solutions, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1997), appeal pending, Nos.
97-3180 & 97-3186 consolidated, (10th Cir. Appellant Brief filed Sept. 27, 1997).
114. Id. at 1047.

115.
The universal service language contained in the second sentence of section
332(c)(3)(A) merely clarifies that states wishing to ensure the universal availability of affordable telecommunications services may regulate the rates and market
entry of commercial mobile service providers if certain preconditions are satisfied. Nothing in that sentence indicates any intent to prevent states from attempting to guarantee universal availability of telecommunications services through

Number 3]

HOG TIGHT, HORSE HIGH, AND BULL STRONG

575

was limited. 6 This result is surprising in light of the fact that the court recognized that "[i]n interpreting statutes, courts must not be guided by a single
sentence or portion of a sentence, but' must
look to the provisions of the
17
whole law, and to its object and policy."
Had the court considered the provisions of the entire Communications
Act, it would have realized that plenary jurisdiction vested in the FCC
through the interplay between sections 2(b) and 332. Unfortunately, despite
the recognition of this principle of jurisprudence, the court chose to ignore,
rather than apply it-an ironic result considering the court's statement that
its "'task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.""' 8 Even more alarming is that, in failing to give effect
to the congressional mandate, the court asserted that "[s]uch a broad interpretation, however, would have the effect of gutting nearly all regulatory
authority over wireless telecommunications providers, a result that Congress
did not envision." ' 9 This language stands in stark opposition to the judicial
recognition of the proper role of the judiciary, a role that was recently acknowledged by the Eighth Circuit when it explained that some decisions are
the "Constitutionally-assigned prerogatives of the Legislative Branch of our
national government."' 2 0 In this case, the Kansas federal district court simply
ignored Congress's exercise of its constitutional prerogative.
Another recent case, GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 2 demonstrates
the difficulties a court can encounter when it applies a traditional section
2(b) preemption analysis in the CMRS context instead of analyzing the revised federal framework established by Congress by the 1993 Act amendments. However, the case also reveals that important state interests can still
be addressed even when a strong interpretation of sections 2(b) and 332 is
adopted.
In GTE Mobilnet, the jurisdictional dispute arose when Cellnet, a cellular reseller, filed a complaint with the state commission alleging that GTE
means other than rate or market entry regulation.

Id. at 1048. While the court's statement is literally correct, as shown earlier, it ignores the

requirement of section 332 and the amendment to section 2(b) that places the substantive
responsibility for CMRS regulation squarely on the FCC, not the states.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1047.
118. Id. at 1049 (quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993)).
119. Id. at 1048. As noted above, the Act's legislative history reveals that a federal
regulatory framework for CMRS was in fact precisely the result Congress intended. See supraPart II.C.1 and accompanying text.
120. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 793 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
121. GTEMobilnet, 111 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Mobilnet and New Par, cellular carriers, engaged in discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct 122 and requested that the commission order the companies to cease charging lower rates to affiliated entities that competed directly
with Cellnet.12 In federal district court, the defendant companies fied for an
injunction to prevent the state commission from adjudicating the case. Specifically, GTE Mobilnet and New Par argued that section 332(c)(3)(A) explicitly preempted the state commission from hearing the case because the
relief sought would involve rate regulation by the state commission.1 4 Cellnet appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction claiming that because
section 332(c)(3)(A) did not facially preempt state law, the district court, under Younger v. Harris125 and Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.'26 should
have abstained from hearing the dispute and allowed the state commission to
determine the preemption issue. 17
332(c)(3)(A) did not present a facially
The court found that sectionS 128
conclusive instance of preemption. In doing so, it examined whether an
FCC conclusion that "market conditions with respect to such services fail to
protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates
that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory' 1 9 indicates congressional
intent to preempt the regulation of discriminatory rates by state commissions. After rejecting such an interpretation, the court assessed whether the
two-prong test established in CSXT, Inc. v. Pitz30 required abstention.' This
analysis first involved determining whether state and federal courts possess
concurrent jurisdiction and, if so, then determining whether
S132 adjudication at
the state level is preferable under the Younger principles. After determining the existence of concurrent jurisdiction' and the existence of ongoing
state proceedings simultaneously implicating important state interests and
presenting adequate opportunities to raise constitutional issues,13 the court

122. Id. at 472.
123. Id. at 473.
124. Id.
125. Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (requiring that principles of comity and federalism
guide abstention decisions).
126. Pullman, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
127. GTE Mobilnet, 111 F.3d at 474.
128. Id. at 469.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)(i) (1994).
130. CXST, 883 F.2d 468, 472-74 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990).
131. GTEMobilnet, 111 F.3d at480.
132. Id. at 480. "Federal courts abstain out of deference to the paramount interests of
another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and federalism." Quackenbusch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 (1996).
133. GTEMobilnet, 111 F.3d at481.
134. Id. at 482. The third requirement was satisfied because of the ability of a court to
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concluded the federal district court should have abstained and permitted the
state commission to determine the preemption issue. 15
The fundamental question raised by this case and ignored by the appellate court was whether allegedly discriminatory rates constitute a ratemaking question or a consumer protection/antitrust issue subject to state jurisdiction pursuant to section 332's "other terms and conditions" language.
The resolution of disputes regarding discriminatory rates traditionally has
been reserved for the FCC under section 202 of the Communications Act.13
As such, the court's determinations depart from established precedent and
fail to recognize the uniquely "federal" aspects of the claim. While state. law
may address such activities under broader consumer protection legislation,
claims of "discriminatory pricing" fall squarely within the Commission's jurisdictional domain. To the extent, therefore, the case supports consideration
of such
claims by state courts, its results and reasoning should be criti37
cized.
Despite the conflicting decisions coming out of some courts, there have
been decisions that recognize Congress's intent. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Iowa Utilities is the most recent decision exemplifying this approach.13 1 While the court's eventual opinion invalidated the majority of
FCC pricing rules so as to uphold state jurisdiction over common carrier intrastate landline services, the court also squarely confronted the interplay
between section 152(b) and section 332 and reached a very different conclusion as to CMRS providers than the Mountain Solutions and GTE Mobilnet

courts. The court unequivocally acknowledged Congress's intent to create a
federal regulatory framework for CMRS and resolved the issue by stating:
Because Congress expressly amended section 2(b) to preclude state
regulation of entry of and rates charged by [CMRS] providers, see 47
U.S.C. §§ 152(b) (exempting the provisions of section 332),
332(c)(3)(A), and because section 332(c)(1)(B) gives the FCC authority to order LECs to interconnect with CMRS carriers, we believe that
review the decision of an administrative agency even though that would be the point at
which the constitutional issues were raised.
135. Id.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
137. See, e.g., The Just and Reasonable Nature of, and State Law Challenges to, Rates
Charged by CMRS Providers When Charging for Incoming Calls and Charging for Calls in
Whole-Minute Increments, Petitionfor a Declaratoryruling of Southwestern Bell Mobile
Systems in DA 97-2464 (petition date Nov. 12, 1997) (responding to numerous class actions being filed in state courts against CMRS providers, and seeking a declaratory injunction stating that the rates are governed by federal law and that § 332(c)(3) forbids state jurisdiction).
138. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998); see also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Iowa Utilties decision.
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the Commission has the authority to issue the rules of special concern
to the CMRS providers .... Thus, [the FCC's interconnection rules]

remain in full force and effect with respect to the CMRS providers,
and our order of vacation does not apply to them in the CMRS context. 139

The Iowa Utilities decision's wireless conclusions are particularly persuasive. Emphasizing the need to focus on a "plain reading" of the statute,
the court realized the irrelevance of attempting to rely on preemption analysis or the impossibility exception when it came to the wireless industry.' 4°
Instead, after affirming that "section 2(b) remains a Louisiana built fence
that is hog tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate turf," 141 the court recognized that "Congress
is fully capable of opening the gate in the 2(b) fence.., when it wishes to do
so.1,142 Indeed, the court acknowledged that Congress had not only recognized the need to open the LouisianaPSC gate so as to allow the wireless4 industry to flourish, but had in fact done so with the 1993 Act amendments.' 1
While the decision in Iowa Utilities is indicative of how this watershed
jurisdictional debate should play out in the future, a recent FCC decision exemplifies the pitfalls of failing to take into account the entire CMRS regulatory framework crafted by Congress. In the Pittencrieff Order,"4 the FCC
examined the interplay between sections 254(f) and 332(c)(3)(A) to determine whether the State of Texas could require CMRS providers to contribute
to a state-run universal service fund assessed on intrastate telecommunications revenues. The FCC denied Pittencrieff Communications's petition for a
declaratory ruling requesting that the FCC use its section 332 authority to
preempt certain sections of the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995
that requires CMRS providers operating in Texas to contribute to the state
universal service fund. The FCC determined that nothing in section 332 precludes states from requiring CMRS providers to contribute on an "equitable
and nondiscriminatory basis" to state universal service mechanisms. The
FCC relied on the Universal Service Report and Order145 for its conclusion
in the Pittencrieff Order that section 332(c)(3) does not preempt the State of
Texas from requiring CMRS providers to make intrastate-based universal
139. Id. at 800 n.21.
140. Id. at 796.
141. Id. at 800.
142. Id. at 797.
143. See also Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 561-62 (D.C. Cir.),
clarified on reh'g by 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State
Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998) (No. 97-1072).
144. PittencrieffOrder, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041 (1997).
145. Universal Serv. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109
(1997).
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service contributions. 46 The FCC stated: "We affirm the decision in the Universal Service Order on this issue and find that Section 332(c)(3) does not
preempt Texas from requiring CMRS providers to contribute to state universal service mechanisms such as the [Texas] Telecommunication Infrastructure Fund or the [Texas] Universal Service Fund."'147
The Pittencrieff Order purports to justify the FCC's decision permit-

ting state universal service assessments as follows:
The second sentence [of 332(c)(3)] sets forth a specific exception for
universal service rate and entry regulation where CMRS is a substitute
for land line telephone exchange services for a substantial portion of
the communications within such State. That is, states generally are
precluded from regulating the rates that CMRS providers may charge
in order to recover their universal service support contributions except
where CMRS serves as a substitute for a land line service. Thus, we
find.., that the second sentence refers to a state's exercise of authority that would otherwise constitute prohibited regulation of rates or
entry, and that the second sentence does not affect a state's ability to
....
require universal service support contributions
This interpretation, however, is unsupported by the unambiguous language of section 332. Contrary to the result-oriented interpretation offered by
the Commission, the second sentence of section 332(c)(3) confirms state
authority to impose nondiscriminatory "requirements" (not rate recovery
mechanisms or surcharge obligations) on CMRS providers "to ensure the
universal availability of telecommunications services at affordable rates.' 49
The appearance of this sentence in a section that otherwise addresses the
preemption of state ratemaking authority does not alter its meaning. This
sentence was added to ensure general limitations on state ratemaking authority would not extend to "requirements" with respect to universal service,
provided the condition in the parenthetical was satisfied. In addition, the
FCC concludes that "[i]f we were to read section 332(c)(3) to preclude
CMRS providers from maling contributions to state universal service support mechanisms... that reading would contradict the direct language of
150
section 254(f) that 'every telecommunications carrier' must contribute."'
146. In its UniversalService Fourth Report and Orderon Reconsideration,the FCC relies on the reasoning in the PittencriefOrderas justification for subjecting CMRS providers
to state universal service requirements. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.,
FourthReport and Order on Reconsideration,CC Dkt. No. 96-45, 1997 WL 797523 (Dec.
30, 1997). However, as noted above, the PittencrieffOrderfails to consider the role of section 2(b) in determining Congress's intent for the scope of FCC jurisdiction over wireless
providers.
147. PittencrieffOrder,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041, para. 13.
148. Id. para. 24.
149. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1997).
150. PittencrieffOrder,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041, para. 25.
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However, two principles of statutory construction stand in direct opposition
to this view: (1) the repeal of laws by implication is disfavored; and (2) general provisions are subordinate to more specific ones."' Because the 1996
Act mandates that section 332 remains in full effect except where expressly
amended, the more general universal service enactment in section 254 does
not override section 332's provisions relating to CMRS providers' state universal service obligations.
Citing the statute's legislative history, the FCC also concluded in the
PittencrieffOrder that the Texas universal service provisions fell within the
"other terms and conditions" language of section 332(c)(3)(A) and is neither
a rate regulation nor an entry regulation. However, the PittencrieffOrder
interprets the relevant legislative history incorrectly. The House Report on
the 1993 Budget Act amendments demonstrates that Congress intended the
states to regulate only those "other terms and conditions" that fall within the
state's "lawful authority." As noted previously, the legislative history provides an express list of "other terms and conditions" which may be deemed
within a state's lawful authority: "customer billing information and practices
and billing disputes and other consumer protection matters; facility siting issues (e.g., zoning); transfers of control; the bundling of services and equipment; and the requirement that carriers make capacity available on a wholesale basis.... 15'
The list makes no mention of universal service. An
examination of this House Report list of terms and conditions considered to
be within a state's lawful regulatory authority (i.e, within a state's police
powers) reveals that state-imposed universal service assessments on wireless
carriers fall well outside of the congressionally-mandated scope of a state's
lawful regulatory authority.'54
Applying a "plain meaning" reading to the statute yields the same conclusion reached by the Connecticut court in Metro Mobile: if state universal

151. See, e.g., Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 564 (D.C. Cir.),
clarified on reh'g by 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State
Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1997) (No. 97-1072). The court
looked at the entire statute, including § 152(b)'s "statutory construction" provision, before
concluding that Congress intended § 276 to endow the FCC with the authority to regulate
local coin call rates. Id.
152. The Commission determined that "Congress intended [other terms and conditions]
to include 'such other matters that fall within a state's lawful authority."' PittencrieffOrder,
9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041, para. 16 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588).
153. H.R. REP.No. 111-103, at 261 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
154. Once Congress modified section 2(b) to exclude CMRS, the FCC gained exclusive
jurisdiction over "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities or regulations for or
in connection with intrastate communication service..." except as otherwise provided for
in section 332.47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1).
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service levies were also considered to be "other terms and conditions" the
first sentence of section 332(c)(3)(A), exempting state authority over "other
terms and conditions" from preemption, would render the second sentence in
section 332(c)(3)(A) wholly redundant. 55 Thus, adopting the FCC's Pittencrieff Order reading of the statute leads to an incongruous result: states
would be allowed to regulate "other terms and conditions" of CMRS services in the section's first sentence and then again be permitted to impose
these same regulations on CMRS providers through the section's second
sentence.
Besides conflicting with the statute's legislative history and accepted
principles of statutory interpretation, imposing state universal service levies
on CMRS providers' inherently interstate telecommunication services does
not constitute a lawful state activity. The FCC's Pittencrieff Order can be
read as broadening the concept of "other terms and conditions" appropriate
for state regulation to such an extent that very little of substance would be
left within the FCC's regulatory sphere.15 6 Such a sweeping expansion of
state jurisdiction would undermine the regulatory framework and goals
adopted by Congress in the 1993 and 1996 Acts. Such a misreading of sections 2(b) and 332 would also interpose significant hurdles in the path of the
wireless industry's competitive development.
Unlike the Iowa Utilities decision, the PittencrieffOrder did not consider section 2(b) in its analysis and instead focused on sections 332 and 254
exclusively. Perhaps because of this crabbed approach, the FCC upheld the
state universal fund contribution requirement at issue and failed to recognize
that Congress has explicitly "opened the gate" for federal CMRS regulation.
The Pittencrieffpetition was filed before the enactment of the 1996 Act and
could not take into account the Eighth Circuit's CMRS findings in Iowa
Utilities. Because the case fails to make use of the full regulatory tapestry
woven for CMRS by Congress (i.e., sections 2(b), 254, and 332), the FCC
has ignored Congress's 1993 requirement that CMRS operate under federal
regulation. This approach may be attributed to the Commission's concerns
about political objections from states if they are unable, even temporarily, to
impose universal service obligations on CMRS providers.5 7 By failing to

155. See Metro Mobile CTS Inc. v. ConnecticutDept. of Pub. Util.Control,No. CV-95051275S, 1996 WL 737480, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
156. While the Eighth Circuit in Iowa Utilitiesnarrowly construed grants of authority to
the FCC over purely interstate matters and prohibited the FCC from regulating intrastate
matters absent express, unambiguous statutory language, this narrow approach to construction is inapplicable where, as in the case of section 332, Congress has amended section 2(b)
to provide expressly such authority to the Commission.
157. As a jurisdictionally interstate service, CMRS should not be subject only to state
universal service programs.
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recognize that Congress explicitly "opened a gate" for FCC regulation of the
CMRS industry and "fenced in" this area for the FCC, the decision allows
Texas (and other states) to ignore the law and Congress's intent, thereby imposing a financial burden on wireless operators despite their limited market
penetration compared to wireline operators.
The unwillingness of the Commission to rely on the jurisdiction found
by the Eighth Circuit exposes Pittencrieff Communications and all CMRS
providers to unnecessary financial burdens and the technically daunting, if
not impossible, task of attempting to allocate their intra- and interstate revenues. The 1996 Act yields no indication nor technological reason to speculate that Congress in any way intended this result. In fact, section 254(f) of
the 1996 Act (the intrastate universal service provision) applies by its terms
only to intrastate telecommunications, while CMRS service, if properly understood, is an interstate telecommunications service. Congress, thus, did not
create a conflict between sections 332 and 254. Rather, Congress explicitly
stated in section 601(c)(1) 58
of the 1996 Act that the previously established
law was to remain in effect.1
Perhaps illuminating a path out of the Pittencrieff Order's analytical
labyrinth, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals issued three recent nonwireless opinions exhibiting the sort of jurisdictional and statutory
analysis centered on congressionally expressed meaning advocated by the
Authors. In Illinois Public Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC,59 the court
evaluated challenges to an FCC order "revamping the regulatory regime for
the payphone industry pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996."'' 6
Having decided that allowing market forces to set the prices for local calls
would best ensure fair compensation for providers,16 ' the FCC ordered the
deregulation of the local market unless "a particular State could demonstrate
that competition would not constrain prices, because, for example,
payphones at certain locations could be priced at monopoly rates."' 62 Because the 1996 Act gave the FCC authority to act only with respect to those
158. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
159. Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n, 117 F.3d 555 (D.C. Cir.), clarified on reh'g by 123
F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66
U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998) (No. 97-1072).
160. Id. at 558.
161. Id. at 559-60 (citing Implementation of the Pay Tel. Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20,541,
paras. 48-49, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 938, reconsideredby Order on Reconsideration, 11
FCC Rcd. 21,233, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 321 (1996)).
162. Id. at 560 (citing Implementation of the Pay Tel. Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20,541,
para. 51, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 938, reconsidered by Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC
Rcd. 21,233, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 321 (1996)).
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calls for which payphone service providers (PSPs) were not already fairly
compensated, the FCC first determined for which type of calls PSPs were not
being fairly compensated. Because local coin calls fit that description,' 63 the
Commission exercised authority to regulate these calls despite the section
152 prohibition against federal regulation of "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection
with intrastate
1
6
carrier."
any
of
radio
or
wire
by
service
communication
State regulatory commissions and the National Association of the State
Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) challenged the Commission's decision on the grounds that the FCC lacked the authority to preempt the states
from regulating local markets. 16' The court squarely confronted the issue of
whether section 276 of the 1996 Act expanded FCC jurisdiction in the ab166
sence of an accompanying express amendment of section 2(b). To answer
this question, the court focused on the use of the word "compensation" and
the way in which this term had been utilized elsewhere in the statutory
scheme. 'This analysis revealed that because there was no indication of
congressional intent to exclude local coin rates from the section 276 term
"compensation" and the only compensation a PSP receives from local calls
is generally the coins deposited, the statute "unambiguously grants the
Commission authority to regulate the rates for local coin calls.' 68 As the
Court noted:
The Supreme Court has held that "[tlhe crucial question in any
preemption analysis is whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."
... [The only question is whether in § 276 [of the 1996 Act] the
Congress gave the Commission the authority to set local coin call rates
in order to achieve that goal [of 'fair compensation' for payphone op-

163. Id. at 559. Additionally, the FCC determined that the PSPs were not fairly compensated for access code calls, subscriber 800 and other toll-free calls, and 0+ calls provided by
PSPs affiliated with a BOC. Id.
164. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
165. Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n., 117 F.3d at 561.
166. Id. Specifically, section 276 authorizes the FCC to "establish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each and
every completed intrastate and interstate call using their payphone" so as "to promote competition among payphone service providers .... ." Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec.
151(a), § 276(b)(1), 47 U.S.C.A. § 276(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). For an explanation of the
compensation schemes in place prior to the enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
see Illinois PublicTelecommunicationsAss'n, 117 F.3d at 558-59.
167. IllinoisPub. Telecomm. Ass'n., 117 F.3d at 562.
168. Id. Additionally, the court concluded that because Congress expressly authorized
FCC preemption of state regulation, there was no requirement that the federal regulation be
narrowly tailored. Id. at 563.
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erators]. We conclude that it did.'69

Thus, relying on a holistic reading of the statute, the court upheld FCC jurisdiction over traditionally intrastate subject matter in the absence of any overt
amendment to section 2(b). The Supreme Court recently allowed the decision of the D.C. Circuit to stand. 70
Subsequently, in Bell Atlantic Telephone Co. v. FCC,17 ' the D.C. Circuit examined the interplay between two potentially conflicting sections of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act' in determining the propriety of an FCC
Order regarding the scope of permissible activities for the Bell Operating
Companies. 17 The court applied the analytical framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council174 to determine the
proper method of review of agency interpretation of a statute which the
agency administers. 75 Accordingly, the court first sought the "plain meaning" of the statute by using the ""'traditional tools of statutory construction"
to determine whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue"" 176 so as to preclude judicial deference to the agency interpretation."
After using these "traditional tools of construction" in an attempt to ascertain
congressional intent, the court found the statute ambiguous and proceeded to
the Chevron analysis' second step-determining whether the Commission's
interpretation was "reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose and
legislative history." 17' This step involved considering the text, legislative
history, and congressional purpose to determine whether the FCC had

169. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Lousiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369
(1986)) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).
170. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998) (No.
97-1072).
171. Bell At. Tel. Co., 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
172. Specifically, while section 272(a) mandates that a Bell Operating Company could
not "provide origination of most communications services between Local Access and
Transport Areas ('interLATA services') except through a separate affiliate," section
272(e)(4) provides that a Bell Operating Company "may provide any interLATA or intraLATA facilities or services to its interLATA affiliate if such services or facilities are made
available to all carriers at the same rates and on the same terms and conditions .... Id. at
1045; 47 U.S.C.A. § 272(e)(4) (West Supp. 1997).
173. Specifically, the petitioners were challenging an FCC Order determining the correct
interplay to be a denial of operating rights to the BOCs.
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
175. Bell At. Tel. Co., 131 F.3d at 1049.
176. Id. at 1047 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d
1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)) These traditional tools
include the statute's text, legislative history, structure, and purpose. The court stressed that
when undertaking a textual analysis, it is necessary to contextualize each provision. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1049.
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adopted a permissible interpretation. 79 Additionally, the court sought to determine whether Congress had either explicitly or implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the FCC.'80 After declaring that "[bly declining itself to
strike an exact balance between the commands of § 272(a)(2) and §
272(e)(4), Congress implicitly delegated to the Commission the authority to
accommodate the interests at stake through its own interpretation of the statute' 8' and noting that the Commission's interpretation was both reasonable
and consistent with the legislative history'12 and purpose,'83 the court deferred
to the FCC interpretation of the appropriate interplay between the two statutory provisions.'84

Most recently, in SBC Communications v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
adopted a jurisdictional approach analogous to that advocated by the Authors
for evaluating the relationship between the FCC and state regulatory bodies
under section 271(c)(1) of the 1996 Act. Similar to the amendments Congress passed in 1993 in section 332 (c)(3), Congress in 1996 expressly designated the interLATA long-distance services at issue in section 271 as subject to exclusive Commission jurisdiction. The court found that Congress's
statutory assignment of jurisdictional responsibility made further inquiry
along the LouisianaPSC "fence lines" to be wholly inappropriate:
Nor is the Commission obliged to defer to the OCC's [Oklahoma
Corporation Commission's] judgment that SBC satisfied Track A. Although the Commission must consult with the State commissions, the
statute does not require the FCC to give the State commissions' views
any particular weight. Unless the FCC concludes to its own satisfaction
that the applying BOC has satisfied either Track A or Track B, as well
as the other statutory requirements, it "shall not approve authorization." Louisiana Public Service Commission, which holds that matters

in connection with interstate service are "fence[d] off from FCC
reach," simply does not apply in this case. Congress has clearly
charged the FCC, and not the State commissions, with deciding the
merits of the BOC's requests for interLATA authorization, and interLATA service is typically interstate.For these reasons, we uphold the
Commission's determination that SBC's application did not satisfy
179. Id.
180. Id. This portion of the analysis was also mandated by the Chevron Court which
provided that should such delegation be found "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency." Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1049-50. Specifically, the court found that because the legislative history was
inconclusive, the Commission's interpretation was not inconsistent. Id.
183. Id. The court noted that the policy purpose of the statute could have been
"preventing the BOCs from entering the interLATA origination market except through affiliates until the sunset of § 272(a)(2)." Id. at 1050.
184. Id.
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While the circuit court's reliance on such statutorily expressed congressional intent to determine state-federal jurisdictional boundaries for
communications regulation is apt, as some of the caselaw reviewed in this
Article shows, the courts and Commission have by no means adopted a uniform analytical approach to issues presented by the Communications Act, as
amended. These divergent perspectives adopted by courts and regulators
have left wireless providers with scant certainty as to how and by whom they
will be regulated. New technology is therefore being shackled by old landline requirements and the intra-/interstate, dual regulatory scheme, and both
judges and commissioners are experiencing difficulties in adopting a consistent and coherent interpretation of Congress's intent for a federal CMRS
regulatory framework. While the issue may be resolved by the Supreme
Court during the 1998-99 term, 117 both courts and the FCC would be served
best by an approach (similar to the D.C. Circuit's) that looks to Congress's
expressed intent and the unique technologies embodied by the wireless industry to serve the public interest of American consumers.

B.

State and Local Anticompetitive Burdens on CMRS Providers

In addition to the divergent approaches taken by some courts and the
FCC, another significant problem has been the historic tendency of state
commissions to place high burdens on CMRS providers. A review of the

185. SBC Comm. v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1998) (No. 97-1425). The court reached
its conclusion that the FCC had been given exclusive jurisdiction under section 271, even
though Congress did not take the "extra step" of amending section 2(b), as it had in enacting section 332(c)(3).
186. See, e.g., Cel-Tech Comm., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 59 Cal. App. 4th
436, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (review granted). In a remarkable example
of state judicial disregard for FCC plenary jurisdiction over CMRS, the California Court of
Appeal recently upheld the application of a state unfair competition law to cellular providers-almost undoubtedly the exact sort of state regulation of CMRS "rates and entry" prohibited by Congress. Specifically, the case involved a complaint by Cel-Tech, a provider of
cellular telephones, alleging that L.A. Cellular had violated several provisions of state competition law by selling cellular telephones below cost in an attempt to boost subscriber levels for its cellular service. Id. At the time of the litigation, L.A. Cellular was one of two
companies licensed by the FCC to provide cellular service in the Los Angeles area. Id. at
444, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. L.A. Cellular maintained that the high price elasticity of cellular phones prevented it from obtaining new subscribers and that selling the phones below
cost was the best strategy to obtain new subscribers because subscription contracts often
accompanied phone purchases. Id. at 244, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213. Significantly, the California state court only evaluated the companies' conduct under state unfair competition
laws without addressing federal telecommunications law or the interplay between § 332 and
§ 2(b) regarding rates and entry of CMRS providers.
187. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
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past and present regulatory landscape reveals not only that some states have
attempted to abuse traditional police and taxing powers, but that several
states have enacted legislation that demonstrates a near total disregard for
federal law. Additionally, several states' attempts to apply the traditional inter-/intrastate dichotomy for regulatory purposes have forced industry innovators to expend needless time and financial resources in administrative and
judicial litigation. These burdensome state regulations show the necessity
' toward the
and wisdom of Congress's decision to take a "national view"188
regulatory framework for CMRS providers.
1.

Local Zoning

Faced with the realization of exclusive federal jurisdiction over CMRS
providers, states have seized on their perceived remaining authority by imposing moratoria on the siting of additional transmitters within their localities. These local actions are ostensibly grounded in section 332(c)(7)(A)
which provides: "Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities."' 8 9
Rather than signaling a significant augmentation of state power, however, the legislative history of the 1993 Act and entire statutory scheme contained in the 1996 Act reveal that section 332(c)(7)(A) represents Congress's
desire to ensure that burdensome zoning restrictions are not used to derail the
development of the wireless communications industry.
The legislative history of the 1993 Act illustrates that, had Congress
intended for states to retain unrestricted zoning authority, the 1996 Act's
statutory grant of power would have been unnecessary. Specifically, the
1993 Act's legislative history demonstrates that the phrase "other terms and
conditions" in section 332(c)(3)(A) was meant to include zoning authority.' 90
If Congress had sought to maintain the status quo, it could have dispensed
with the provisions of the 1996 Act relating to zoning authority. Instead of
preserving the status quo, however, Congress severely blunted this potential
sword of state regulators to ensure this authority did not derail federal objectives. Although section 332(c)(7)(A) initially appears to preserve unfettered
state regulatory discretion, the long list of exceptions in section 332(c)(7)(B)
reveals that the limiting phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph," actually signals a significant shrinking of state regulatory authority. In essence,
188. See HOLMES, supra note 1.
189. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 704, § 332(c)(7)(A), 47 U.S.C.A. §

332(c)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
190. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

the exceptions swallow the grant of authority. 9 '
Congress limited state and local authority by imposing both substantive
and procedural limitations on the exercise of this retained power. Congress
proclaimed that regulations concerning the placement, construction, and
modifications of wireless service facilities shall neither "unreasonably
. 192 discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services"' nor
"prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless
services."'93 Additionally, Congress's desire to save service providers from
continuous costly litigation resulted in the admonition against regulating facility placement, construction, and modification "on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such
regulations."'' 94 To protect the public against the harmful effects of inappropriate state and local zoning restrictions, Congress imposed procedural requirements for state and local authorities to follow when acting on a request
to improve service facilities. Specifically, Congress mandated that the locality act within a "reasonable period of time" on any request 195 and that the decision be in writing' 9' and supported by "substantial" evidence. Finally, in
recognizing the threat of endless entanglement in administrative hearings,
Congress provided that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action
or failure to act... may... commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction" and required the court to "hear and decide such action on an expedited basis."'9 8
Unfortunately, despite the plain meaning of the statutory language and
obvious congressional intent, states are continuing to use zoning regulations
to prevent the entry of CMRS providers into local markets.'99 While the
191. The section 332(c)(7)(B) limitations add a host of procedural requirements and
prevent state and local governments from using many of their previous bases for regulation.
192. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).
193. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll).
194. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). The desire to prevent costly and time consuming
litigation over these issues is evidenced by the statutory grant of authority permitting a
party who has suffered from state and local disregard of these provisions to directly petition
the FCC for relief. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The FCC's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau has ruled that a state law requiring a local utility commission to issue a report
on the health risks of RF emissions prior to recommending siting regulations violated § 332
to the extent regulations apply to facilities in compliance with FCC emission standards.
William J. Franklin, Siting Issues: The Latest Word, WMELESS WORLD, Feb. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8479764.
195. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
196. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
197. Id.
198. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).

199. Don Bishop, Editorial, Beseeching for Antenna Sites, and a New Partnerfor Pri-
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sheer number of moratoria is alarming, the greater threat to the wireless industry comes from the rate at which states and localities are attempting to
use these moratoria to evade the section 253(a) prohibition against regulations that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity
to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." 2°° Despite
the repeated arguments of states and localities that siting moratoria are not
being employed to prohibit the expansion of the telecommunications industry, the substantial costs incurred by CMRS providers forced to await the
lifting of or challenge the moratoria alone highlights the anticompetitive ef-

fects of such state action.01

Fortunately, there has been a growing judicial recognition of the detrimental nature and illegality of these moratoria. Therefore, despite an early
decision in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina,202 which gave state
commissions hopes of using these methods to stall or thwart the placement
of wireless radio towers, many courts realize the punitive nature of these
moratoria and are expressly disavowing the persuasiveness of that holding. 2°3
Specifically, courts are repeatedly stressing that the Medina decision was
justified because the moratoria had been issued five days after the enactment
of the 1996 Act and therefore "seeking time to deal with an expected flurry
of applications," 206 it constituted a "bonafide effort to act carefully in a field
with rapidly evolving technology." 20 These decisions indicate that as time
passes, attempts to justify these moratoria probably will fail.206 In addition,

RADIO TFCH., Sept. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11284332
(reporting a recent Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) report demonstrated that 226 moratoria were in effect as of June 1997).
200. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a). Specifically, the CTIA report noted that the 226 moratoria
represented an increase of 34% from the number of moratoria that had been in place two
months earlier. Bishop, supra note 199.
201. Sprint in Battle in Wash. over Tower Moratorium, WARREN'S TELECOMM. REG.
MONTrrOR, May 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 16298659. For example, when the city of
Medina imposed a six month moratorium, Sprint suffered a large monetary loss. Id. Such
losses are a discouraging factor for any new company contemplating entering the marketplace after having spent potentially up to $105.2 million for the license. Sprint Spectrum,
L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996). When Sprint challenged the
moratorium and requested the court to order the City to make a decision on the permit, the
court held that the City had acted within its authority and upheld the moratorium which had
been enacted five days after the enactment of 1996 Telecommunications Act. Id.
202. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036.
203. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1466 (N.D. Ala.
1997); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Farmington, 1997 WL 631104, at *6 (D. Conn.
1997) (stating that "[d]efendant's reliance on Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Medina ... is unpersuasive").
204. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. at 1037.
205. Id. at 1040.
206. The moratorium in Jefferson County was enacted fifteen months after the passage
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courts will recognize the importance of the procedural requirements 2 7 and
the need to avoid judicial endorsement of efforts that effectively prohibit
wireless services0 8 and unreasonably discriminate among service providers. 2 0 In essence, courts are likely to appreciate the Jefferson County recognition that "[t]he series of moratoria issued by the Commission represent an
anti-competitive impediment to expansion of communication serv-

ices ....
,210 Finally, increased judicial recognition of these attempts to evade
the congressional mandates may result in courts taking a more active role in
fostering the development of the wireless industry. 211

2.

State and Local Taxes

While the above-mentioned zoning restrictions are the most prevalent
form of regulations that impede the congressional goal of a national telecommunications infrastructure, states also are using their taxing authority in
a way that may hinder the development of mobile services. 212 While the ability of a state to use its taxing authority legitimately is beyond dispute, 2 ' the
of the 1996 Act. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1466. The
moratorium in Farmington was enacted sixteen months after the 1996 Act became law.
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Farmington, 1997 WL 631104, at *6.
207. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of West Seneca, 659 N.Y.S. 2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1997). BellSouth Mobility v. Gwinnet County, 944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(concluding that the denial by the Board of Commissioners had not been supported by substantial evidence). Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1468 (stating
that the refusal to act on applications was tantamount to a denial and therefore had to be in
writing).
208. Spring Spectrum, L.P. v. Farmington, 1997 WL 631104, at *6 ("[T]he moratorium
unreasonably delays consideration of Sprint's implementation requests and effectively prohibits wireless telecommunications services.").
209. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1467 ("[Ejarlier entrants
have benefitted most from the moratoria, in that they have been sheltered from the competitive forces of a free market, while late entrants offering superior technology have been burdened in their attempts ....
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 929 (involving issuance of judicial
writ of mandamus to a county commission to grant a permit to a wireless carrier).
212. Several States Tell FCC Not To Block Taxes on PCS Licenses, COMM. TODAY,
Sept. 11, 1996. The most egregious example of such an impermissible abuse of taxing powers arose when the Oregon Department of Revenue, viewing the license as tangible personal
property, assessed Western PCS approximately $500,000 in annual taxes for its Portland
license. Jeffrey Silva, Oregon Tax Battle Could Provide Precedentfor PCS Providers,RCR
RADIO COMM. REP., Dec. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15830127; see generally, Daniel
S. Welytok, Taxing the Wireless Communications Business: An Overview of Issues and
Trends, 7 J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 59 (1997) (providing an overview of the taxation of cellular telephone services).
213. Both the House and Senate provisions versions of the 1993 Act incorporated language that would have prevented state and local governments from imposing personal
property or similar ad valorem taxes on the value of a PCS license. However, the Conferees
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prohibition against state interference with CMRS providers' attempts to enter the market has twice been explicitly stated by Congress. In 1993, Congress codified this admonition by mandating that "no State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of... any commercial
mobile service or any private mobile service .... ,,24 While the 1993 Act
amendments referred solely to wireless communications, Congress's realization in 1996 of the need to prevent state interference with the development
of a national telecommunications infrastructure is evidenced by section
253(a), which provides that "[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any215entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecom-

munications servce.
Unfortunately, despite these legislative provisions, states are continuing
to impose discriminatory and excessive property taxes on service providers
that have the effect of financially burdening wireless services and indirectly
regulating future entry through the use of inflated valuations1 6 and discrimi-

agreed to drop the language relating to state and local government tax treatment of parties
who have obtained licenses under the Communications Act providing:
It is the intent of the Conferees to clarify that nothing in this Act alters or affects
the authority or lack of authority of State and local governments to assess ad valorem property, or other taxes on the licensee. The Conferees do not intend for the
deletion of the proposed House and Senate language to create any other inference
regarding the subject matter of the proposed provisions.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-213, at 486-87 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1175,
1175-76.
State taxing authority was reaffirmed with the passage of the 1996 Act. Section
601(c)(2), the state tax savings provision, provides that "[n]otwithstanding paragraph (1),
nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or supersession of, any State
or local law pertaining to taxation, except as provided in sections 622 and 653(c) of the
Communications Act of 1934 and section 602 of this Act." Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 601(c)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 143 (47 U.S.C.A. § 152 advisory
note (West Supp. 1997)).
214. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994).
215. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (emphasis added).
216. Several States Tell FCCNot To Block Taxes on PCS Licenses, supra note 206. The
disputed tax in Oregon was based on the 'real market value' of the license, $40.7 million,
even though the company actually had paid only $34.2 million for the license. Id. Western
PCS asked the FCC to preempt the Oregon Department of Revenue's valuation of the BBlock license acquired by Western PCS through an FCC auction. Id. In response to Western's request, the FCC opened up a comment period. Western PCS I Corp. Petition Requesting Preemption of the Or. Dep't of Revenue's Proposed Tax Assessment, Public Notice, II FCC Rcd. 8787 (July 30, 1997). In 1997, the wireless industry had lobbied the state
legislature to pass a bill prohibiting the assessment of taxes on FCC licenses-an effort that
ultimately failed when Oregon's governor vetoed the bill. Telephone Interview with Marilyn Harbur, Assistant Attorney General to the Oregon Department of Justice (Mar. 26,
1998). Wary of a renewed industry lobbying effort in 1999 and possible future litigation
costs, Oregon state officials recently entered into a settlement with Western PCS that in-
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The impositions of discriminatory excessive up-

front assessments prior to operation discourage entry and place the new
service providers at a competitive disadvantage.21 ' Because "'in a competitive milieu, where [mobile] services (and providers) must compete head-tohead, an excessive or discriminatory tax... can quickly create significant,
severe competitive consequences,"' consumers will suffer decreased market benefits if the courts and the FCC fail to enforce the legislative prohibitions against such abuses.
3.

Fees

In addition to discriminatory property taxes, states are also assessing
burdensome franchise 220 and rights-of-way fees 221 on CMRS providersthereby claiming funds that might otherwise go toward product innovation
and industry development. Although section 253(c) maintains local authority
to require compensation for use of public rights-of-way,2 2 basing these fees
on a carrier's gross revenues221 violates the statutory requirement that such
levies be imposed on a "competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis ' '224 and the prohibition against effectively prohibiting services.m Additionally, local authorities have attempted to regulate the entry of CMRS procluded a compromise on value very favorable to Western. Id. The Oregon Department of
Revenue also recently settled a similar dispute with Sprint Spectrum under comparable
terms. Id.
217. Silva, supra note 212. In Oregon, for example, the Department of Revenue taxes
new entrants but not incumbent cellular services providers.
218. In Oregon, the tax assessment disadvantages and discourages those who bought
licenses in secondary markets or at auction. Id.
219. CTIA Wants NPRM on State, Local Tax Preemption, TELECOMM. REP., Sept. 30,
1996, availablein 1996 WL 15880560 (quoting CTIA) (alteration in original).
220. See generally Robert L. Bland, FranchiseFees and Telecommunications Services:
Is a New ParadigmNeeded?, STATE TAx TODAY, Feb. 11, 1997 (providing more information on the subject of franchise fees).
221. For example, one city has attempted to require wireless carriers to offer discounted
communications services, pay franchise fees on gross income, and provide other communications facilities as the price of obtaining franchise agreements for the city. Franklin, supra
note 194; WTB Responds to CTIA 's Request for Rule Clarificationon State, Local Authority,
MOBILE PHONE NEws, Jan. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7937574. Others have required CMRS providers to obtain city franchises and pay a "gross revenue fee" for rights to
operate, give the city rights to buy property at end of the franchise term, and solicit municipal approval of license transfer. Allied and Competing Technologies, MOBILE SATELITE
REP., Nov. 20, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 10666499.
222. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 253(c), 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(c)
(West Supp. 1997).
223. Minn. Town Fees for Cellular Antennas and Service Attacked by Industry, COMM.
DAILY, Nov. 13, 1995, at 4.
224. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(c).
225. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a).
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viders by the imposition of exorbitant annual registration fees for the
"privilege" of siting towers. 2 6 While fees such as these often are recognized
immediately as illegal attempts to regulate entry, 227 wireless providers incur
unnecessary costs and delays
in rectifying these violations in court.
IV. STATE REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
CONGRESS'S FEDERAL FRAMEWORK IS REQUIRED
As this examination of recent decisions and onerous regulations reveals, application of the traditional preemption analysis to CMRS issues has
yielded few satisfying or coherent results. Perhaps much of the confusion
and conflicting interpretations in this area stem from a mischaracterization of
the problem at hand. The Commission and courts are accustomed to sizing
up all conflicts between state and federal telecommunications regulations as
preemption problems and asking the "either-or" question: "Is it proper for
the FCC to 'preempt' state rules?" Jurists usually grapple with the tough
constitutional questions associated with preemption and assess whether there
is an actual conflict between the state and federal rules and whether
the state
2
regulations undercut any of Congress's expressed policy goals. 28
A careful reading of the statute reveals that when it comes to CMRS
regulation, courts need not reach the thorny issue of whether it is truly
"impossible" to separate interstate and intrastate portions of mobile calls.
Nor is the proper question to ask, "Can the FCC preempt state regulation?"
but rather, "Did Congress give the FCC the exclusive power to regulate
CMRS?" If the answer to the latter question is yes, there is no need to balance competing interests or analyze whether state regulation interferes with
federal goals. Indeed, where Congress grants specific spheres of influence to
state and federal bodies, such delegations of authority must be implemented
by federal agencies and confirmed by the judiciary without modification.
Such is the case with the regulation of CMRS. As explained above, the pertinent federal legislation229 unequivocally affirms the delegation to the FCC.
Consequently, any inquiry into state-federal relations must focus on FCC ju226. Franklin, supra note 194. For example, a local Florida proposal involved a charge
of $40,000 per year for authority to construct and maintain a 200-foot tower, plus 25% of
the value of each antenna lease, on an annual basis. Id. Another locality attempted to use its
authority to charge annual fees on construction permits for wireless facilities and modifica-

tions of existing structures. WTB Responds to CTIA's Request for Rule Clarification on
State, Local Authority, supra note 221.
227. Franklin, supra note 194; WTB Responds to CTIA 's Requestfor Rule Clarification
on State, Local Authority, supra note 221.
228. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); Pittencrieff Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041 (1997).
229. The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)).
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risdiction rather than on preemption of state authority that has been substantially circumscribed.
The key premises outlined in this Article depict the proper CMRS
regulatory framework. First, because CMRS technology is inherently interstate, state regulation based on "other terms and conditions" is inappropriate.
Second, because Congress expressly carved out CMRS regulation for the
FCC by statute, Louisiana PSC-style preemption analysis is unnecessary in
determining the proper scope of state regulation. Based on the plain language
of sections 2(b) and 332 of the Communications Act and legislative intent,
state concerns may, and should, be taken into account by the FCC in making
regulatory decisions related to CMIRS. However, neither courts nor state
regulators should attempt to expand to "other terms and conditions" include
substantive regulatory jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court ruled in Louisiana PSC, a regulatory body that
lacks jurisdiction is without the power to act.23° Through the adoption and
amendment of section 332, Congress has eliminated state regulatory authority over almost every aspect of CMRS. Thus, the traditional inquiry into inter-/intrastate separations is unnecessary. Accordingly, under sections 2(b)
and 332, only the FCC has the capability to enact or enforce rules or policies
governing CMRS, regardless of whether they are inter- or intrastate calls.
Recently, the FCC has given strong signals that it also recognizes that
the old inter-/intrastate dichotomy may be wholly inappropriate for much of
today's communications technology.2 3 In October 1997, the Commission
called for comment on whether the seventy-seven year old Supreme Court
decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell, 2 (which initially established the separations process) still has relevance in today's continually changing communi23
cations world. The FCC is seeking to determine whether "'market conditions have changed so drastically since that decision as to make its holding
inapplicable.... ,,234

230. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 374. "First, an agency literally has no power to act...
unless and until Congress confers power upon it. Second, the best way of determining
whether Congress intended the regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law
is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency." Id.
231. "Creating the telecommunications supermarket may mean abandoning some old
practices-practices that no longer fit the revolution that is upon us." William Kennard,
FCC Chairman, Remarks to Practicing Law Institute, Dec. 11, 1997, at 14, available in
1997 FCC Lexis 6940.
232. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
233. Jurisdictional Separations Reform and Referral to the Federal-State Joint Bd., Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 22,120 (1997).
234. FCC Asks How To Change Jurisdictional Separations in Competitive Environment,
TELECOMM. REPORTS,

Oct. 13, 1997, at 35, availablein 1997 WL 7758901 (quoting Juris-

dictional Separations Reform and Referral to the Fed.-State Joint Bd., Notice of Proposed
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While the FCC is occupied by the myriad challenges of implementing
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it should not overlook the considerable role CMRS can play in introducing competition to local markets. Recent
cellular subscriber growth has increased dramatically, cellular and PCS subscribership increased by exceeding 13.2 million customers in 1997, and the
total wireless market is expected to grow by 61 million subscribers in five
years, reaching 118 million by 2002 or 42 percent of the U.S. market.2 5 The
decisions taken now by the Commission and the courts will determine
whether wireless consumers in the coming century will experience a true
golden age of added freedom and technological progress or remain grounded
by the outdated distinctions of the past. To fulfill the promise that lies ahead,
Congress's vision of a federal regulatory policy for CMRS must be "fleshed
out" and given form both by jurists and by regulators. The FCC must enunciate reasoned principles fulfilling Congress's will to avoid state conflicts
that threaten the viability of emerging wireless competitors. Indeed, the FCC
must directly address these initial jurisdictional issues before both regulators
and service providers are wearied by unnecessary regulation and litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
During the last five years, the U.S. Congress has invested an enormous
amount of energy in developing telecommunications policies that promote
investment and competition. The mere enactment of laws is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition to promote Congress's objectives. For example,
state regulatory or court decisions that have the effect of contradicting Congress's aims will prevent competition from developing. CMRS is an important matter of general interest because these service providers are at the front
of the wave of new entrants and service providers. If they succeed, then it is
more likely that competition will spread and ultimately replace monopoly
and regulation. It is a noble and important experiment. The Authors believe
that the experiment is worth continuing until its conclusion. Experiences in
other communications markets, such as the long-distance industry, have
shown that under the right circumstances competition can supplant monopoly. Consistent rules and time are required, perhaps as much as a decade.
Recently, over sixty countries around the world signed the World Trade
Organization basic telecommunications agreement to open telecommunicaof
a strong
States
United
to competition.
tions
markets
proponents
strongproponent
be was
no less
should
makers
States policy The
United
that treaty.

Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 22,120, para 333).
235. Telephony, CoMM. DAILY, Nov. 14, 1997, at 3 (citing report by Strategis Group).
236. See Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354
(1997) (Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)).
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of competition in the wireless market within this country. In practice, this
means resisting the temptation to get the regulatory nose under the tent and
relying upon market forces to address consumer needs. For a telecommunications industry that has been regulated for nearly a century, that is no small
paradigm shift to accept. If the industry's promise is to be achieved, that shift
is an essential one that must be maintained.

APPENDIX
This chart demonstrates how the legislative developments in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (1993 Act) and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) have changed the Communications Act
of 1934 (1934 Act) to vest the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction
over all rates regarding Local Exchange Carrier (LEC)-to-Commercial
Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) interconnection.

Statute/Case Law
In 1914, the Supreme
Court held in Shreveport Rate Case' that
the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) had the power
under the governing
federal statute to order an increase in
intrastate
specific
railroad rates charged
to customers in order
to avoid discrimination against interstate
commerce.

Intrastate
Interstate
The authority delegated States have no jurisby Congress to the ICC diction. The ICC has
"extending to these in- jurisdiction over intraterstate carriers as in- state railroad rates.
struments of interstate "The powers conferred
commerce, necessarily by the act are not
embraces the right to thereby limited where
control their operations interstate commerce
in all matters having itself is involved. This
such a close and sub- is plainly the case
stantial relation to inter- when the Commission
state traffic that the finds that unjust disagainst
control is essential or crimination
appropriate to the secu- interstate trade arises
rity of that traffic, to the from the relation of
efficiency of the inter- intrastate to interstate
state service, and to the rates as maintained by
subject to the
maintenance of condi- a carrier
,3
tions under which inter- act."
state commerce may be
conducted upon fair
terms and without mo-2
lestation or hindrance.,
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Statute/Case Law
Interstate
The 1934 Act estab- Section 2(a) reserves to
lishes dual a regula- the FCC exclusive jutory framework.
risdiction over interstate
communications.

In 1964, the D.C.
Circuit held that a
space research laboratory's local microwave
communications
facilities,
although physically
located within a single state, are jurisdictionally
interstate
when used to terminate spacecraft data
communications primarily in interstate or
foreign commerce.

The FCC has exclusive
jurisdiction over physically intrastate facilities
used to terminate communications in interstate or foreign cornmerce.

5
___________
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Intrastate
Section 2(b) reserves
to the states jurisdiction over intrastate
communications.
When Congress was
drafting the 1934 Act,
section 2(b) was proposed and supported
by state commissions
"in reaction to what
they perceived to be
the evil of excessive
federal regulation of
intrastate service such
as was sanctioned by
the Shreveport
Rate
'4
Cases[.]
States do not have jurisdiction over physically intrastate facilities used to terminate
communications
in
interstate or foreign
commerce.
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Statute/Case Law
In 1980, the Second
Circuit held that the
charges for intrastate
distribution of interstate foreign
exchange and common
control switching arrangement
services
are
jurisdictionally
interstate.6
In 1984, the D.C.
Circuit held that the
FCC has authority to
prohibit restrictions
on resale of intrastate
WATS services used
to complete interstate
communications.

In 1987, the Supreme
Court held in Louisiana PSC that the
Section 2(b) "fences
off' intrastate depreciation rates from
FCC jurisdiction. To
preempt state regulation of such matters,
the FCC must show
that: (i) it is impossible to separate the
intrastate and interstate portions of the
subject to be regulated; and (ii) the
state regulation conflicts with the valid
federal goal.

APPENDIX
A

Interstate
The FCC has jurisdiction over all jurisdictionally interstate services: "The key to
jurisdiction is the nature of the communication itself rather than
the physical location
of
' 7
the technology.

Intrastate
The states lack jurisdiction over physically
intrastate, but jurisdictionally interstate facilities and services.

"The dividing line between the regulatory
jurisdictions of the FCC
and states depends on
the 'nature of the cornmunications which pass
through the facilities
[and not on] the physical location of the
lines."' 9
Section 2(a) reserves to
the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over
interstate depreciation
rates.

The states do not have
jurisdiction over services that are jurisdictionally interstate in
nature, even if physically intrastate.

Section 2(b) reserves
to the states jurisdiction over intrastate depreciation rates.
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Statute/Case Law
In 1987, the FCC
finds pursuant to
Louisiana PSC that it
lacks jurisdiction over
intrastate
LEC-tocellular interconnection rates and costs
because they are severable from interstate
LEC-to-cellular rates
and costs.'0
In 1993, Congress
enacts the Budget Act
of 1993, amending
Sections 2(b) and 332
of the Act.
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Interstate
The FCC has jurisdiction
over- LEC-tocellular rates for interstate services,

Intrastate
The states have jurisdiction over LEC-tocellular rates for intrastate services.

All
CMRS
is
"federalized" by section
332, which vests plenary authority in the
FCC to implement the
definition of, and level
of Title II regulation
applicable to, all CMRS
providers. Section 332
also gives the Commission exclusive authority
to hear state petitions to
receive rate regulation
authority.

Section
2(b)
is
amended to except
section 332 from the
general reservation of
state
jurisdictional
authority. The states
no longer have any jurisdiction over CMRS,
or LEC-to-CMRS interconnection
rates.
The scope of federal
authority reverts to the
amplitude
of presection 2(b) Shreveport Rate Case.

Section
332(c)(1)(B)
authorizes the Commission to order physical
interconnection
between CMRS providers
and LECs pursuant to
section 201. Section
201(a) authorizes the
Commission to order all
common carriers engaged in interstate or
foreign
communications by wire or radio to
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Interstate
establish physical interconnections, upon reasonable request, and at
just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory
rates. LEC-to-CMRS
interconnection
is

Intrastate

"federalized."

In 1996, Congress
enacts the Telecommunications Act of
1996. Section 253 of
the 1996 Act authorizes the Commission
to preempt state and
local laws that prohibit, or have the effect of prohibiting,
the ability of any entity to provide interstate or intrastate
telecommunications
service.

Section 253 authorizes
the FCC to preempt
any state requirement
inhibiting provision of
interstate or intrastate
telecommunications
service.

Subsection
253(e)
provides
that
"[n]othing in this
section shall affect
the application of
section 332(c)(3) to
commercial mobile
service providers."

Federal preemption of
state rate and entry
authority over CMRS
providers is preserved.

Section 332(c)(3) of
the 1993 Act already
preempts state barriers
to entry for CMRS
providers, and the
1996 Act does not
disturb this legislative
mandate.

Section 251(i) of the
1996 Act makes clear
that the new interconnection provisions
"are in addition to,
and in no way limit or
affect, the Commis-

The FCC's plenary
authority over all LECto-CMRS interconnection under Sections
332(c)(1)(B) and 201(a)
is preserved.

The 1993 Act's elimination of state authority over "intrastate"
components of LECto-CMRS
interconnection is not affected
by the 1996 Act.
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Statute/Case Law
sion's
existing
authority under section 201 of the Communications Act."

Interstate

Intrastate

601(c)(1)
Section
provides that the
1996 Act "shall not
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or
local law unless expressly so provided in

The 1996 Act must not
be
construed
"impliedly" to repeal
the 1993 Act's grant of
jurisdiction
plenary
over CMRS to the FCC.

The 1996 Act must not
be construed impliedly
to reinstate state rate
and entry authority
over CMRS previously
eliminated by the 1993
Act.

Congress is authorized
to expand section 2(b)
limitations by enacting
legislation granting the
FCC intrastate ratemaking authority. Congress did so in section
543(b)(1) of the Cable
Act where it granted the
FCC power "to ensure
that the rates for the basic service tier are reasonable"' 2 and in section 276 of the 1996
Act where it required
the FCC "to establish a
compensation plan regarding both intrastate
and
interstate
pay
3

The absence of a direct
grant of FCC authority
provides an "indication that Congress intended to reserve for
the states the retained
authority to set the
prices regarding the
local competition provisions contained
in
section 251.,,4

[the 1996 Act]".

In 1997, the Eighth
Circuit applied a
strict reading of section 2(b) in Iowa
Utilities Board v.
FCCto hold that "the
1996 Act, when coupled with section
2(b), mandates that
the states have the
exclusive authority to
establish the prices
regarding the local
competition
provisions of the Act.""

phone calls."'
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Statute/Case Law
In 1997, the D.C.
Circuit
confirmed
that Congress, by enacting section 276 of
the 1996 Act requiring the FCC to establish regulations ensuring that payphone
operators be "fairly
compensated,"
authorized the FCC to
set local coin rates for
payphones
and
thereby
preempt
states'
power
to
regulate such rates.'5

APPENDIX

Interstate
The FCC's jurisdiction
over local coin rates did
not arise by implication, but rather, Congress gave the Commission
"an
express
mandate to preempt
State regulation of local
coin calls."

Intrastate
The Court found that,
while Section 276 was
subject to the substantive and interpretive
limitations of 2(b),
Congress's grant of
authority to the FCC
was so "unambiguous"
and "straightforward"
as to override the
command of section
2(b).

1. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
2. Id. at 351.
3. Id. at 358.
4. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 372 (1986).
5. See California Interstate Tel. Co. v. FCC, 1 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 2095, 2099
(1964); California Interstate Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
2081, 2082 (1963).
6. See New York Tel. Co. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. See id. at 1066 (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 16869 (1968); General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
888 (1969)).
8. See NARUC v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9. See id. at 1498 (quoting California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); NARUC v. FCC, 738 F.2d 1095, 1114-15
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 214-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 938 (1983)).
10. See The Need To Promote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio
Common Carrier Services, DeclaratoryRuling, 2 FCC Rcd. 10, para. 18, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d

(P& F) 7 (1987).
11. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. grantedsub nom.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998). Incumbent local exchange carriers
(ILECs) challenged the FCC's mandate on state commissions to employ the "total element
long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC) method to calculate the costs that an ILEC incurs in
making its facilities available to competitors. Id. These costs are then used to determine the
price that an ILEC may charge its competitors. Id. at 793. ILECs disliked the fact that the
TELRIC method does not incorporate their "historical" or "embedded" costs-those costs
that an ILEC incurred in the past to build its local network and has not yet fully recovered
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under state regulation. Id. at n.8.

12. Id. at 797.
13. Id. (citing Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 561-62 (D.C. Cir.
1997)). The Eighth Circuit distinguished direct grants of authority contained in both the
Cable Act and in section 276 of the 1996 Act from "roundabout construction" of authority
under section 251. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied sub nom. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 66 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Mar.
30, 1998) (No. 97-1072). Several telecommunications service providers and state regulatory
commissions challenged various aspects of the Commission's payphone regulations. Id. The
petitioners argued, among other things, that (1) the 1996 Act did not authorize the FCC to
set local coin rates for payphones and (2) the FCC's decision to deregulate local coin rates
for payphones was arbitrary and capricious.

